Democracy and Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji by Carens, Joseph H.




Democracy and Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji 
Joseph H. Carens 
University of Toronto 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Cultural Heritage Law Commons, Indian and 
Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph H. Carens, Democracy and Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 547 
(1992). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol25/iss3/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
DEMOCRACY AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE:




I. A Short History of Fiji .................
A. Native Fijians and the Colonial Regime
.... 554
.... 554
B. Fijian Indians ..................
C. Group Relations ................
....... 560
....... 563
D. Colonial Politics ....................... 564
E. Transition to Independence ........
F. The 1970 Constitution ...........
G. The 1987 Election and the Coup ....
II. The Morality of Cultural Preservation:
The Lessons of Fiji .................
III. Who Is Entitled to Equal Citizenship? ...
A. The Citizenship of the Fijian Indians
B. Moral Limits to Historical Appeals:








* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto. A.B., Holy Cross
College, 1966; M.Phil. 1970, M.Phil. 1972, Ph.D. 1977, Yale University.
My work on this topic was aided by a paper on Fiji written by Julia Schtivelman for
a seminar that I taught in 1987-88 and by the research assistance of Richard Verrier.
An earlier and much shorter version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Political
Science Association annual meeting in June 1988 and at the American Political Science
Association annual meeting in August 1988. I benefitted from Ronnie Beiner's comments
at the former and Don Moon's and Nancy Rosenblom's comments at the latter. I also
would like to thank the members of a faculty seminar on membership organized by
Howard Adelman for their comments on the first version. A revised and enlarged version
was presented at the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Symposium,
Preservation of Minority Cultures (Feb. 15, 1992) (audiotape on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). I would like to thank the participants, especially
Marie Deveney, for their comments. Finally, I express my appreciation to Edie Goldenberg
for her skeptical response to my summary of the argument over dinner in Ann Arbor.
Her doubts helped me to sharpen and clarify the argument. My work has been assisted
financially by a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
548 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL.25:3 & 4
C. Justice and Citizenship .................. 581
1. Who Belongs? ...................... 582
2. Equal Citizenship ................... 584
D. Justice and History ..................... 585
E. Democracy Versus Cultural Preservation? . . . . 588
IV. Justice, Moral Relativism, and Cultural Difference 589
V. Justice, Culture, and History:
How Difference Matters ...................... 593
A. Moral Questions ....................... 593
B. The Moral Justification of Cultural Preservation:
An Overview........................... 594
C. Objections ............................ 597
D. Permissibility and Contingency in Morality... 598
VI. Continuity and Change in History, Culture, and
Morality: The Issue of Land ................. 599
A. Objections to Colonial Land Policy ......... 599
B. Context and Contingency in the Evaluation
of the Past ........................... 601
C. Cultural Change, Moral Legitimacy, and
Contemporary Land Policy ............... 603
D. Is Cultural Preservation Always Paternalistic?
Inalienability and Interests ............... 606
VII. Authenticity, Interests, and Democracy:
Three Challenges to the Moral Legitimacy
of Chiefly Authority ........................ 608
A. Authenticity and Cultural Change ......... 609
1 Colonial Promotion of Chiefly Rule ...... 610
2. How Much Continuity Is Enough?
Who Decides? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  612
B. Is Chiefly Authority Good for Fijians? . . . . . . . 617
1. The Liberal Challenge to Fijian Culture . . 617
2. Defending Fijian Difference ........... 620
3. Minimal Moral Standards and
the Good Life ...................... 623
C. Democracy, Chiefly Authority, and
Fijian Difference ....................... 629
SPRING AND SUMMER 19921
INTRODUCTION
This Article is part of a larger project in which I am exploring
some normative questions about political community, in particular
questions about who belongs to a political community, what may
be expected of members, and what moral claims outsiders may
advance against the community. I will focus here on questions
about the relationship between political communities and culture.
For American readers of this Journal, the phrase "preservation
of minority cultures" may evoke images of Native Americans,
Old Order Amish, or perhaps ethnic groups seeking to maintain
aspects of their cultural and linguistic heritages in the face of
the homogenizing pressures of a modern, bureaucratic, mass-
consumption society. For someone writing from a Canadian
perspective, as I do, it also brings to mind francophones and their
demands for greater autonomy for Quebec. Looking beyond North
America, one might think of Islamic immigrants in Western
Europe trying to maintain their religious traditions, of Kurds
in the Middle East seeking to preserve a language and culture
against the pressures of four different states, of Afrikaners in
South Africa trying to protect their minority culture in new ways
now that the old ones have failed, or of the many ethnic groups
in conflict in Eastern Europe over issues connected to the
minority position of one or more groups within a political unit.
I introduce these examples of preserving minority cultures as
a way of suggesting the moral complexity of the topic. Few people
would either endorse or oppose every effort at cultural preserva-
tion on the list. But how should we discriminate among them?
When is it justifiable to try to preserve a minority culture and
by what means? And who may legitimately do so? May a
political community play a role in preserving a minority culture?
Ought it to do so? Or, alternatively, ought political communities
to avoid becoming involved in efforts at minority cultural
preservation?
These questions, like the Symposium as a whole, focus on the
preservation of minority cultures, but the word "minority" evokes
its opposite "majority" and hence the same sorts of questions
about the preservation of majority cultures. Should it be assumed
that majority cultures do not need preserving or, alternatively,
that a majority will see to the preservation of its own culture?
The two assumptions have significantly different implications,
however, since the latter implies a political involvement in culture
The Case of Fiji
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that the former seems to eschew. We should pay attention,
therefore, to the ways in which what we think about the responsi-
bilities of political communities for majority cultures affect our
views of their responsibilities for minority cultures as well.
To what extent should our answers to these normative
questions about the preservation of minority cultures be
dependent on specific political, historical, or indeed cultural
contexts, and to what extent are the answers generalizable? For
example, contrast the recent Canadian image of incorporating
immigrants into a cultural mosaic-ostensibly aiming at the
preservation of the immigrants' distinctive cultural heritages
while weaving them together into a new whole-with the older
American image of the melting pot-ostensibly blending people
of different origins together so that the origins are not preserved
in any recognizable way.' Leaving aside the question of whether
the social realities of the two countries correspond in any way
to these images, is either preferable as a general ideal of the way
that political communities ought to respond to cultural differ-
ences, or is there no such generalizable ideal? Perhaps there
is a range of morally permissible ideals. Does this mean that
different political communities simply may choose among them
on the basis of the majority's preferences, or are there other moral
considerations that ought to count?
I so far have deliberately used the phrase "political community"
rather than "state" in order to leave open the question of what
political units might act to preserve culture. In the modern world,
we tend to equate "political community" with the term "state,"
but many people feel stronger ties to some smaller political unit,
often because they share some crucial elements of culture, like
language, with the majority of those in the smaller unit but not
with the majority of those in the state. For example, many
francophones living in Quebec identify themselves more strongly
as Quebecers than as Canadians. When I said above that the
phrase "preservation of minority cultures" brought to mind franco-
phones in Quebec, I wrote as an anglophone Canadian. Most
francophones in Quebec think of themselves as members of a
1. Cf. Howard Palmer, Mosaic Versus Melting Pot? Immigration and Ethnicity
in Canada and the United States, 31 INT'L J. 488,488-528 (1976) (arguing that the mosa-
ic/melting pot distinction arose largely out of differing political, historical, and economic
events rather than from differing social attitudes towards assimilation).
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majority culture because they think of Quebec, not Canada, as
their primary political community, even though Quebec is a
province and Canada a state. (Some of those who regard Quebec
as their primary political community want it to become an
independent state, but others do not.) At the same time,
Quebecers think of their (majority) francophone culture as
vulnerable and threatened because of the predominance of
anglophones, not only in Canada but in North America as a
whole. They therefore support vigorous political action to
maintain and promote (majority) francophone culture.2 So, even
the categories "majority" and "minority" can be ambiguous in
significant ways.
Finally, there is the question of what it means to preserve a
minority culture or to try to do so. 3 Sometimes those opposed
to such efforts try to show that minority cultural preservation
is self-contradictory or impossible in practical terms.4 This may
be true in particular instances, but that sort of argument cannot
possibly rule out all attempts to preserve minority cultures. As
the examples cited in the beginning of this Article should make
clear, there are many circumstances in the world today where
the question of what people legitimately may do in order to
preserve a culture cannot be settled by defining cultural
preservation as an impossibility. Still, this sort of challenge does
force people who are sympathetic to at least some efforts to
preserve minority cultures, as I am, to clarify their understanding
of what that entails.
Suppose that the following generalizations about culture apply
to most, or all, of the minority cultures that people want to
preserve: (1) cultures evolve and change over time; (2) cultures
are influenced, directly and indirectly, by other cultures; (3)
cultures contain conflicting elements; (4) cultures are subject to
many different, often conflicting, interpretations, by both
2. See KENNETH MCROBERTS, ENGLISH CANADA AND QUEBEC: AVOIDING THE ISSUE 9,
40 (1991).
3. See generally Peter H. Welsh, Repatriation and Cultural Preservation Potent
Objects, Potent Pasts, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 837 (1992).
4. In his contribution to this Symposium, Jeremy Waldron sometimes uses this
sort ofreductio ad absurdum argument to criticize attempts to preserve minority cultures.
See Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 751, 763-64 (1992).
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members and outsiders;5 (5) the extent to which a particular
culture provides value and meaning to the lives of the people who
participate in it may vary among the members of the culture and
may itself be a topic of interpretive dispute; and (6) members
of one culture may be exposed to, have access to, and even
participate as members in one or more other cultures.
Can one acknowledge all these claims about cultures and still
talk sensibly about preserving a culture? I think so, and I will
try to say why in this Article. The claims draw our attention
to important concerns about continuity and change, authenticity
and authority, involvement and evaluation. I will discuss how
such concerns should affect our moral reflections upon cultural
preservation.
To explore these issues, I will take up the case of Fiji, a small
island state in the South Pacific. Why Fiji? First, I think that
it offers a compelling illustration both of the reasons why
attempts to preserve minority cultures are sometimes morally
justifiable and of the reasons why attempts to preserve minority
cultures are sometimes morally problematic. Second, Fiji is
unfamiliar, unlike the United States or Canada or the other sorts
of cases that readers are likely to know. In my view, the abstract,
general theories of political philosophers tend to be shaped and
limited by a few key examples that the theorists use to illustrate
their principles, sometimes only implicitly because they assume
that their readers will have the same cases in mind. In an impor-
tant recent book, Will Kymlicka argues that contemporary liberal
theorists like Dworkin and Rawls are blinded by the case of
blacks in the United States, wrongly extrapolating from Brown
v. Board of Education6 the conclusion that special rights for
minorities are always incompatible with the liberal commitment
to equal citizenship.7 Kymlicka effectively uses the examples
of aboriginals and francophones in Canada to make the case that
special rights for cultural minorities may be a way of imple-
menting a commitment to equal concern and respect.' But
Kymlicka's examples also limit his theoretical analysis in ways
that I hope a discussion of Fiji will make clear.
5. Sometimes the disagreement will be about who is a member and who is an
outsider, but often there are interpretive disagreements between members, between
outsiders, or between members and outsiders where the membership status of the
interpreters themselves is not an issue in dispute.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, CoMMuNITY AND CuLTuRE 140-46 (1989).
8. See id. at 186-90.
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To be sure, Fiji is just one more case with its own limitations
and idiosyncrasies. No theorist can discuss every case, and, if
one attempts to be exhaustive, one risks losing one's theoretical
perspective altogether. But I think there is a lot to be gained
by multiplying unfamiliar narratives if we can draw out the
implications of these narratives for familiar theoretical positions.
My basic strategy is to articulate our intuitive judgments about
particular cases in terms of theoretical principles and to examine
and criticize our theoretical principles in light of their implica-
tions for a wide range of cases.9
In this Article, "The Case of Fiji" is inevitably the story that
I tell about Fiji. Any such narrative is an interpretation. It is
bound to contain controversial and contestable elements and to
reflect, in ways of which I am only partly conscious, my own
particular angle of vision. Someone else would tell the story
differently. But that does not mean that there is no point in my
trying to tell it.
In what follows, I will first offer a capsule history of Fiji. I
then will identify some of the moral questions that emerge, both
for the inhabitants of Fiji and for us as observers. I will present
some tentative answers to these moral questions, reflecting as
I go on what this tells us about the possibilities and limits of
normative theory, but also trying to note where my normative
judgments rest upon features of the story that I think others
would want to contest and trying to indicate how alternative
readings of the history would affect the normative judgments,
if at all. In general, I feel more confident about the importance
of the questions I am asking than about the accuracy of my an-
swers, more certain about the inadequacy of theories that do not
take these issues into account than about the adequacy of my
own theory. I will try to keep that sense in view as I proceed.
9. This bears some affinities to what Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium," although
Rawls himself gives little explicit attention to the intuitive moment of this method. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20-21,48-52 (1971). The principal difference is that
I want to give weight not just to what Rawls calls "our considered convictions ofjustice,"
but also to our intuitive, less considered judgments about a range of relatively unfamiliar
but real issues and cases. I do this on the assumption that those intuitive judgments
may be shaped by relevant moral considerations that are obscured in our theories by
the too familiar contours of the issues or cases about which we have "considered
convictions." Part of the task of the movement between case and theory is to try to bring
those relevant but obscured considerations to light and to incorporate them into our moral
theory, thus refining out theoretical principles. Of course, the process of reflection may
also lead us to revise our initial intuitive judgments.
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I. A SHORT HISTORY OF FIJI10
A. Native Fijians and the Colonial Regime
Fiji is a collection of islands in the South Pacific, originally
settled thousands of years ago by people of Melanesian origin."
10. There is an extensive scholarly literature on Fiji, and thus inevitably much
scholarly debate about how to interpret Fiji's past and present. Part I of the Article is
intended to provide a descriptive background so that the reader can think intelligently
about the particular theoretical questions that I subsequently address. I have tried as
much as possible to present a summary overview which does not prejudice the normative
discussion to follow. In other words, I hope that the account I am providing in this section
would be accepted as accurate both by those whose primary sympathies lie with the efforts
to preserve a distinctive Fijian way of life and by those whose primary sympathies lie
with the Fijian Indians or with attempts to transform Fijian society in directions required
by liberalism, capitalism, and/or democracy. The principal sources for my account in
this section are the following AHMED ALl, PLANTATION TO POLITICS: STUDIES ON FuI INDIANS
(1980); TM BAYuSSSM1 m ET AL., ISLANDS, ISLANDERS AND THE WORI]D (1988t CYRIL S BEIsHAW,
UNDEwEATII THE Ivi TREE: SOCIAL AND ECONoMIC GRoWi- IN RURAL FIJI (1964); ALAN BURNS,
FIJI (1963), 1 R.A. DEmJCK, A HISTORY OF Fix (3d ed. 1957 , EI. FuSK, THE POLiICAL ECONOMY
OF INDEPENDENT Fii (1970); PfiER FRANCE, TIiE CHARIER OF THE LAND CUSTOM AND COLONIZA-
TION IN FIJI (1969); KL GILLION, FIJIS INDIAN MIGRANTS AHIsORY TO TI-E END OF INDENmURE
IN 1920 (1962) [hereinafter GILLION, FIJI'S INDIAN MIGRANTS] K.L GILLION, THE Fiji INDIANS:
CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINANCE 1920-1946 (1977) [hereinafter GILUON, CHALLENGE To
EUROPEAN DOMINANCE]; MICHAEL C. HOWARD, FIJI: RACE AND POLITICS IN AN ISLAND STATE
(1991); BRIJ V. LAL, GIRMITIYAS: THE ORIGINS OF FIJI INDIANS (1983); BRIJ V. LAL, POWER
AND PRE ICE: THE MAKING OF THE FIJI CRISIS (1988) Rezuiafter LAL, POWER AND PREJUDICE;
VICTOR LAL, FIJI: COUPS IN PARADISE (1990) [hereinafter LAL, COUPS IN PARADISE]; ISIRELI
LASAQA, THE FIJIAN PEOPLE: BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE (1984); STEPHANIE LAWSON,
THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC POLiTiCS IN FI (1991); J.D. LEGGE, BRITAIN IN Fi, 1858-1880
(1958); TIMOTHY J. MACNAUGHT, THE FIJIAN COLONIAL EXPERIENCE (1982);, ALEXANDER MAMAK
COLOUR, CULTURE AND CONFLICT. A STUDY OF PLURALISM IN FIJI (1978); RR. MAYACAKALOU,
LEADERSHIP IN FIJI (1975); ADRIAN C. MAYER, INDIANS IN FIJI (1963) [hereinafter MAYER,
INDIANS IN FIJI]; ADRIAN C. MAYER, PEASANTS IN THE PACIFIC (2d ed. 1973); JOHN NATION,
CUSiOMS OF RESPECT. THE TRADITIONAL BASIS OF FIJIAN COMMUNAL POLITICS (1978);, ROBERIT
NORTON, RACE AND POUTIC IN FIJI (1977, GK ROT, FIJIAN WAY OF LIFE (2d ed. 1973); DERYCK
ScARR, FUJL POIMCS OF ILiLON (1988) [heinaf SCAR P nCS OF ILUJSIONJ DYIC SCARU,
FIJI: A SHORT HISTORY (1984) [hereinafter SCARR, FIJI: A SHORT HISTORY]; DERYCK SCARR,
RATU SUKUNA (1980) [hereinafter SCARR, RATU SUKUNA]; Ahmed Ali, Fiji: Political Change,
1874-1960, in POLITICS IN FIJI 1 (Brij V. Lal ed., 1986); Roderic Alley, The Emergence of
Party Politics, in POLITICS IN FIJI, supra, at 28; Chandra Jayawardena, Culture and
Ethnicity in Guyana and Fiji, 15 MAN 430 (1980); Brij V. Lal, Politics Since Independence:
Continuity and Change, 1970-1982, in POLITICS IN FIJI, supra, at 74; Robert Norton, Colonial
Fiji: Ethnic Divisions and Elite Conciliations, in POLITICS IN FIJI, supra, at 52.
11. Even discussion of the ancient history of Fiji is fraught with contemporary political
overtones. Some who are critical of governmental efforts to preserve Fijian culture in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and especially of the centrality accorded the
chiefly class in those efforts, argue that the original settlers of Fiji had a more egalitarian
culture and social structure which persists, to some extent, today in Western Fiji. The
strongly hierarchical orientation of contemporary Fijian culture, these critics say, comes
not from the original Melanesian settlers but from later arrivals from Polynesia, who
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The current population is around 715,000.12 In the nineteenth
century, Europeans began to arrive in the islands-first as
traders, then as missionaries, later as commercial farmers.
13
They formed alliances with some of the Fijian chiefs,
facilitating attempts by those chiefs to centralize power. 14 In
1874, as a strategy for dealing with internal political conflicts
and external political and economic pressures, the high chiefs
of Fiji ceded dominion of the islands to the British Crown.' 5
The formal Cession was unqualified, but the chiefs apparently
did receive verbal assurances that the new government would
keep the interests of the Fijians paramount. 6 Arthur Gordon,
the first governor of the colony, apparently took these assur-
ances very seriously (to the dismay of the European settlers)
and developed a number of policies to protect traditional Fijian
society as he understood it.' 7 In particular, he instituted an
administrative system for governing the Fijians through their
traditional rulers and in accord with their own customs; he
prohibited the sale of Fijian land; and his administrative
system discouraged the employment of Fijians as agricultural
workers on European plantations.' 8
arrived periodically as peaceful migrants but also as armed invaders a thousand years
ago. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 10, at 16-18. By drawing attention to the cultural
diversity within the Fijian tradition, and by linking the contemporary chiefly
establishment to people who were not the original inhabitants and who used violence
to establish their presence, these critics hope to undercut the claims of the chiefs to a
central and legitimate place in Fijian culture and tradition.
By contrast, some of those who are sympathetic to the chiefly class and to the efforts
at cultural preservation, in which the chiefly class has played a central role, present a
picture of Fiji's ancient history in which the original settlers developed Polynesian culture
in Fiji and neighboring Tonga, while later migrations brought different cultural elements
from other parts of Melanesia. In this account, concern for status and the other elements
of a chiefly culture were present from the beginning. See, eg., SCARP, FIJI: A SHORT HISTORY,
supra note 10, at 1-3. While I make no attempt to settle this particular issue, I discuss
below the moral relevance of historical claims about continuity and change with regard
to the chiefly class in Fiji. See infra part VII.A.
12. See HOWARD, supra note 10, at 3; LAL, POWER AND PREJUDICE, supra note 10, at
15.
13. LEGGE, supra note 10, at 9-10, 44.
14. Id. at 63-67.
15. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 147-58; SCARR, FIJI: A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 10,
at 51-76.
16. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 1.
17. Ali, supra note 10, at 2.
18. Id. at 2-3.
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The colonial system that Gordon instituted to preserve
traditional Fijian society transformed it profoundly. As one
scholar puts it:
The regional varieties of kinship and social organization in
old Fiji, the underlay of colonial reconstruction, defy
summary analysis and description: suffice to emphasize here
that the colonial order devised and imposed new, very much
simplified principles of authority and territorial organization
which may or may not have meshed with pre-existing
sociopolitical realities.' 9
Gordon's system of administration created provinces and districts
and established formal lines of authority from the village to the
district to the province. He assigned chiefs to fill these positions
largely, though not exclusively, in accordance with his perception
of their hereditary status and rank. This scheme drew more upon
the strongly hierarchical arrangements of eastern Fiji than of
other regions, altering them as well, and thereby strengthening
the role of chiefs in Fijian society.2" Gordon also established the
Council of Chiefs, a periodic assembly of the provincial leaders
and other lesser officials, to advise the governor on Fijian affairs.2 '
Most Fijians and non-Fijians came to see this new group as the
final authority on the interpretation of Fijian custom and
tradition.
To secure the inalienability of Fijian land, Gordon and later
administrators somewhat arbitrarily chose the mataqali, a
kinship or household group, as the "authentic" land-owning unit.
22
Moreover, the administrators defined the mataqali in law in a
way that corresponded to practice in only one part of Fiji. In
contrast, the previous system of land tenure had been much more
complex, informal, and fluid.2 Gordon also gave legal sanction
to customary obligations such as the obligation to provide one's
chief with certain goods and services (lala) or to work under his
direction on communal projects which included such tasks as
building and maintaining houses, improving the water supply,
clearing land, and providing visitors with food.2' More broadly,
19. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 3.
20. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 68.
21. Id. at 69.
22. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 9.
23. See id. at 9.
24. Id. at 5-7.
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native Fijians were legally required to obey their chiefs "in all
things lawful according to their customs."' To reinforce the
prohibition on Fijians indenturing themselves on the plantations,
he made it an offense for Fijians to leave their villages for more
than sixty days without the permission of local authorities and
arranged for taxes to be paid in kind and on the basis of collective
assessments, rather than in cash by individuals.26
Under this regime, native Fijians were participants in a
distinctive culture and way of life that had significant continuities
as well as discontinuities with what had preceded colonization.
Most native Fijians lived in rural villages, rather than in towns
or on independent homesteads." The villages were the center
of their social and economic life. The local authorities were chiefs,
not Europeans. Ordinary people spent their time in the tasks
connected with subsistence agriculture and their communal labor
obligationsY They had little contact with the cash economy.
Various aspects of the culture and of the institutional arrange-
ments emphasized cooperation and sharing within a hierarchical
framework and discouraged individual acquisitiveness or the
production of surpluses. Some villages were involved in trading
networks, but again these were embedded in social relationships
that sharply limited the possibilities for profit.' Native Fijians
placed great emphasis on courtesy and customary modes of
respect, as well as on public ceremonies and festivals which the
chiefs were expected to sustain.
During the first decades of colonial rule, the land was
sufficiently bountiful and the population sufficiently small to
support the village way of life without strain. Indeed, in the first
few decades, largely because of the introduction of new diseases
such as measles, the native population declined substantially.
31
During the first decade of the twentieth century, however, the
population stabilized and then began to grow again. Over time,
more of the best agricultural land was devoted to commercial
farming, some of it farmed by native Fijians but most of it leased
to others. Population growth put increasing pressure on the
remaining land. More native Fijians found it necessary to work
25. Id. at 43 (citing regulations in force during Gordon's governorship).
26. LEGGE, supra note 10, at 235-36.
27. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 64.
28. Id. at 68.
29. Id. at 69.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 13-14.
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as wage laborers, acquired a taste for goods that could only be
obtained for cash, and began to move to the towns.32
These socioeconomic changes were accompanied and furthered
by changes in the colonial administrative regime. Later colonial
officials did not always share Gordon's enthusiasm for maintain-
ing this Fijian way of life. They objected to the way that it
limited individual freedom and penalized enterprise. They saw
the chiefs as autocrats and exploiters of the commoners.' And
they took various steps to free native Fijians from the bonds of
communalism and to grant them the rights, privileges, and
obligations of other British subjects. 34 In the early 1900s, one
governor launched a major effort to change the rules on the
inalienability of land and the related assumption that unoccupied
land belonged to the Fijians.35 The attempt ultimately failed
because Gordon, now Lord Stanmore, was still alive and had great
influence with the Colonial Office.36
Other efforts at administrative change were more successful.
By 1912, indirect rule had formally ended and native Fijians were
formally subject to the direct authority of Europeans through
a system of regulations that applied only to Fijians." But much
of that system had changed too. Restrictions on mobility for men
were abolished, and while restrictions on the mobility of women
remained, they were not as strict as the Council of Chiefs had
requested.' Taxes were to be paid by individuals in cash.
Obligations to provide lala to the chiefs had been restricted and
reduced and disobeying the chiefs on matters of custom was no
longer a legal offense.39 Regulations restricting the hiring of
Fijian labor were largely abolished. While the legal obligation
of native Fijians to contribute to communal tasks remained in
place, the new freedoms made it easier to evade those obligations
and some Fijians, especially the young, did so. During this
period, and in the next few decades, officials devised various
schemes to encourage Fijians to take up cash farming and to
adopt a more individualistic, profit-seeking orientation to
economic activity.4°
32. Id. at 102-03, 107-08.
33. Id. at 12, 38-40.
34. See SCARR, FIJI: A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 10, at 114.
35. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 30-32.
36. Id. at 36.
37. Id. at 43-44.
38. Id. at 102-04.
39. Id. at 43-44.
40. See id. at 145-47.
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The effects of all these changes were not as great as the colonial
officials had hoped or as some native Fijian leaders had feared.
It was more an erosion than a dramatic transformation of village
life.41 Usually, a Fijian villager would depart temporarily, for
a few months or perhaps a year or two, to work for money in the
fields or on the docks. Most people eventually returned to village
life. Most of the attempts to encourage individualism failed, some
of them disastrously so. Just before World War II, eight out of
ten native Fijians still lived in villages.42 Still, it clearly was
becoming harder to maintain the familiar Fijian way of life.
3
By the early 1940s, key British officials had become persuaded
that their predecessors' experiments in promoting individualism
had been failures and that the Fijian communal system had more
merit than they had acknowledged." They reestablished a system
of indirect rule for native Fijians, although they did not reimpose
most of the constraints on individuals that had been removed.
The official goal of this reconstituted Fijian Administration was
to maintain chiefly authority and Fijian village society, working
41. Id. at 103.
42. Id. at 64; LASAQA, supra note 10, at 34.
43. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 103.
44. They were persuaded in no small part by the leading native Fijian official of
the time, Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, a remarkable figure who is acknowledged by his critics
as well as his admirers to have been a person of extraordinary ability and vision. Sukuna
was a member of a leading chiefly family, SCARR, RATU SUKUNA, supra note 10, at 1, and
a profound student of native Fijian custom and tradition (which is not to suggest that
he was an impartial interpreter). At the same time, he had been a student at Oxford,
where he was drawn to the aristocratic conservatism of Sir Henry Maine. See id. at 29,
57-58. Thus, he moved easily between two worlds but was skeptical about the possibility
of bringing those worlds together, at least in the near future. A 1944 speech in support
of the return to indirect rule illustrates his characteristic approach to the problems of
political and social change in Fiji. He offered a politic acceptance of the principles of
equality and democracy as ideals, but denied their immediate applicability to native Fijian
society on historical grounds. (In fact, in other contexts, it seems clear that Sukuna was
hostile to democratic equality in principle for the sorts of reasons that critics since Plato
have always advanced: democracy is directed at the satisfaction of the unregulated desires
of the masses rather than at rule for the common good by the wise few. But such a view
would have been difficult to defend publicly in the midst of World War II.) Sukuna
advocated a gradual, evolutionary transformation of Fijian society in a democratic and
egalitarian direction, but stressed the importance of preserving the strengths of the
traditional Fijian way of life in the process of transformation. In practice, his reforms
and policies placed far more emphasis on preserving chiefly authority, village society,
and other aspects of the Fijian way of life, as he interpreted it, than on introducing
cultural and institutional changes that might make it possible for native Fijians to adapt
successfully to the liberal democratic, capitalist environment that was being imposed
on Fiji by historical forces that it could not have resisted successfully, even if it had had
the collective will to do so. For an excerpt from the speech, see LAWSON, supra note 10,
at 113. For a sympathetic biography of Sukuna, see generally SCARR, RATU SUKUNA, supra
note 10.
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through those institutions to raise the Fijians on to a position
of equality.45 In principle, these officials (like their predecessors,
even Gordon) recognized the need for some significant transforma-
tion of Fijian life. The government had an obligation to prepare
native Fijians to participate in modern economic and political
institutions, including the market economy and, eventually,
democratic politics. Subsistence no longer would suffice. Greater
educational opportunity, economic development, and an improve-
ment in the material conditions of life of ordinary Fijians were
essential. But, in the eyes of those who instituted the new
system, this transformation was to be a gradual one and was to
build on the strengths of the traditional Fijian system-for
example, by emphasizing cooperative enterprise and development
within the context of the village system.'
By the early 1960s, the tide had swung again, at least to some
extent. Two influential reports, both commissioned by the
government, claimed that the Fijian Administration had proved
far more effective at preserving the communal system of village
life, including chiefly authority, than at fostering economic
development for native Fijians.4 7 In response to these criticisms,
the remaining legal obligations to contribute labor to communal
projects were abolished, electoral mechanisms were introduced
in order to make local governmental authorities more accountable
to ordinary Fijians, and new projects were introduced to
encourage more native Fijians to establish themselves as
individual entrepreneurial farmers."
B. Fijian Indians
When the Fijian Administration was reconstituted in 1945 in
order to bring Fijians onto terms of equality,49 the equality at
which the native Fijians aimed was not only equality with
45. Ali, supra note 10, at 15-16.
46. See id. at 15-16; BAYLISS-SMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 68-72.
47. LASAQA, supra note 10, at 156-57.
48. See BAYLISS-SMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 74-76; MACNAUGHT, supra note 10,
at 157-58; Ali, supra note 10, at 23-25. The reports made even stronger recommendations
regarding land reform and the reform or abolition of the separate system of administration
for native Fijians, but these recommendations were strongly opposed by the Council of
Chiefs and were not adopted. See LASAQA, supra note 10, at 156-57, 163 (describing the
chiefs' perspective on the reports).
49. Ali, supra note 10, at 15-16.
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European colonists. By that time, native Fijians were no longer
the majority in their own land, and they were very conscious of
the economic and social progress of the group that was-the
Fijian Indians.50
When Fiji became a British colony, maintaining the Fijian way
of life was not the only concern of the colonial government. The
European farmers wanted labor for their plantations. Since the
government had precluded the use of native Fijians (to the intense
displeasure of the planters), some alternative source had to be
found. To satisfy these demands, Gordon arranged for the
importation of indentured workers from India, a system that
finally ended in 1916 as a result of criticisms from India.5 Most
of the workers stayed on after their labor contracts had expired,
taking up agriculture on their own. There was also a small but
steady stream of free immigrants from India, who came to set
up small businesses or to engage in commercial farming. By
1921, Indians comprised thirty-nine percent of the Fijian popula-
tion.52 By the mid-1940s, Indians outnumbered native Fijians,
largely because of higher birth rates and lower mortality
rates,53 trends that continued until about the mid-1960s when
the Fijian Indians constituted about fifty-one percent of the
population and native Fijians about forty-six percent.54 Since
then, the relative difference between the two groups has
50. Most scholars who write about Fiji, including ones who are themselves of Fijian
Indian descent or who are clearly sympathetic to Fijian Indians, distinguish between
Indians and Fijians without any suggestion that this sort of terminology might be
sensitive, although Mayer noted in the preface to his 1963 book that the term "Indo-Fijian"
was adopted by a 1961 Commission and seemed preferable to "Fiji Indian" as a way of
accurately identifying the status of the members of this community. See MAYER, INDIANS
IN FIJI, supra note 10, at viii. A few recent scholars have adopted this term. I have
followed majority usage, though I have tried for the most part to speak of native Fijians
and Fijian Indians rather than simply Fijians and Indians, in part as a way of
acknowledging the claims of Indian immigrants and their descendants to belong in Fiji.
See infra part III. On the other hand, a graduate student at the University of Toronto,
who grew up in Fiji and emigrated with his family to Canada, told me that in the circles
he knew, people thought of themselves as "Indians" and would be insulted even to be
called Fijian Indians, much less Indo-Fijians.
51. GILLION, FIJI'S INDIAN MIGRANTS, supra note 10, at 1-18, 164-89.
52. Ali, supra note 10, at 13.
53. Id. at 16.
54. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 172. I should note that Lawson's figure of 46% for
native Fijians includes other Pacific Islanders and Rotumans who are sometimes treated
as separate categories. Without them the figure for native Fijians would be 44%. See
Ralph R. Premdas, Ethnic Conflict Management: A Government of National Unity and
Some Alternative Proposals, in POLITICS IN FIJI, supra note 10, at 107, 119.
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narrowed greatly, largely because of the greater emigration
of Fijian Indians during the 1970s and 1980s.55
The experience of the Indian immigrants was, of course, very
different from the experience of the native Fijians. The indenture
system was hard and degrading. It was impossible to maintain
traditional Indian cultural patterns and values, especially the
religiously sanctioned caste system, which required the careful
separation of castes from one another in occupations, marriages,
living arrangements, and many other aspects of social life. On
the ships and plantations, these traditional distinctions largely
disappeared. 56 New patterns of social differentiation eventually
emerged, but on different bases. Religion was far less central
to Indian social life in Fiji than it had been in India.57 The
Indians in Fiji emphasized more secular goals like material
prosperity, social mobility, and individual achievement. They
tended to focus on economic activity. This is not to say, however,
that they abandoned Indian culture altogether.' In language,
religion, dress, and social practices, the Fijian Indians maintained
and preserved a distinct identity that clearly marked them as
culturally different from both native Fijians and Europeans.59
Upon being released from indenture, many of the Indians set
up independent households on land leased from native Fijians.6
The Indians engaged in commercial, rather than subsistence,
agriculture, especially in growing sugar cane.6' Often they hired
native Fijians as day laborers; sometimes these workers were
the ones from whom the Indians were leasing the land.62
Occasionally, native Fijians refused to renew leases with the
intent of engaging in commercial farming themselves.' But these
attempts rarely were successful, and the Indian tenant farmers
complained bitterly about the unfairness and insecurity created
by refusals to renew leases. More politically effective complaints
55. BAYLISS-SMrrH ET AL., supra note 10, at 151-53. The most recent census was in
1986. It reports native Fijians (not including other Pacific Islanders and Rotumans) as
46.2% of the population and Fijian Indians as 48.6%, see LAL, POWER AND PRFUDICE, supra
note 10, at 15, but the gap undoubtedly has narrowed further since then because many
Fijian Indians have emigrated since the coup, see SCARR, THE POLITICS OF ILLUSION, supra
note 10, at 120.
56. See GILLION, FIJI'S INDIAN MIGRANTS, supra note 10, at 122-24.
57. Id. at 124-25.
58. Id. at 124.
59. Id. at 122-25.
60. NORTON, supra note 10, at 10.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Lal, supra note 10, at 81-82.
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came from the Australian company holding a monopoly on sugar
refining in Fiji, which feared a disruption in the orderly supply
of sugar cane. 64
In 1940, in response to these complaints, the government with
the agreement of the Great Council of Chiefs set up the Native
Land Trust Board to control "all native land not required for
immediate use and to administer such land in the best interests
of the Fijians." 5 In practice, this meant that most of the land
stayed in the hands of the Indian tenant farmers because they
could pay the rent. Despite ongoing insecurities about long-term
leases (which remain a crucial political issue today), Fijian
Indians came to dominate commercial farming (replacing the
Europeans) and small retail trade. Fijian Indians eventually took
over significant parts of the transportation and construction
industries as well.' Because the Fijian Indians also placed great
emphasis on the acquisition of higher education, they filled more
of the professions and many white-collar jobs.67 Overall, Fijian
Indians became much more successful economically than native
Fijians.'
C. Group Relations
At the beginning of the colonial period, there was almost no
contact between native Fijians and the Indians who were brought
in as laborers.69 Contact increased a bit over time as the Indians
left the plantations and set up independent homesteads, leasing
land from the Fijians, or established small businesses which
supplied goods to the Fijians.7 ° Still, the dominant pattern was,
and still is, one of separateness, a pattern reinforced by colonial
policies.7
The gulf between the two groups is enormous. Fijians and
Indians speak different languages. The native Fijians speak
Fijian, the Fijian Indians mainly Hindi, although most members
64. GILLION, CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINANCE, supra note 10, at 190-92.
65. Id. at 191.
66. Ali, supra note 10, at 16; Lal, supra note 10, at 82-83.
67. Lal, supra note 10, at 85.
68. Ali, supra note 10, at 16.
69. GILLION, CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINANCE, supra note 10, at 13-14.
70. NORTON, supra note 10, at 10.
71. GILLION, CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINANCE, supra note 10, at 13-14;Ali, supra
note 10, at 8.
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of both groups also speak English.72 They have different religions.
The native Fijians are mostly Christians, having been converted
in the nineteenth century. The Fijian Indians are predominantly
Hindu, although a significant minority (fifteen percent) are
Muslims.7 3 Cultural practices with regard to diet, marriage, and
family relationships also differ. Occupations tend to be dominated
by one group or the other. In towns they live in different neigh-
borhoods. There is almost no intermarriage between the groups,
and there are few social friendships except occasionally at the
elite level. Formally, the educational facilities and teachers are
now shared in common, but there are two teachers' unions, one
for each group.7 4 Most unions and private associations are
formally open but dominated by one ethnic group or the other.
The army is composed overwhelmingly of native Fijians.75
These social differences are accompanied by mutual suspicion
and contempt. Racial stereotypes are pervasive. Native Fijians
regard Fijian Indians as greedy, selfish, and cunning. Fijian
Indians see native Fijians as lazy, uncivilized, and dupes of
traditional authorities.76 But despite these mutually hostile
attitudes, there has been relatively little overt racial conflict.
Most interactions occur in commercial settings and are marked
by common courtesies. The extreme separation between the two
groups has limited the arenas of competition and thus reduced
the likelihood of conflict. Again, this is changing as more native
Fijians seek advanced education and economic opportunities.77
D. Colonial Politics
In politics, as elsewhere, the differences between native Fijians
and Fijian Indians have been profound. From the early 1920s,
Indians in Fiji agitated for equal citizenship among all the
inhabitants of Fiji and a common franchise. In these early stages,
72. See Premdas, supra note 54, at 122-23.
73. Id. at 122, 124.
74. Id. at 123.
75. Hugh Tinker, Fji: A Post-Colonial Plural Society, in THE MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP
REPORT No. 75: FiJI, 3, 4 (The Minority Rights Group ed., 1987).
76. See GILLION, CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINANCE, supra note 10, at 14-15; LAL,
POWER AND PREJUDICE, supra note 10, at 59; see also Norton, supra note 10, at 56 (stating
that animosity between the two groups is "evidenced in the derogatory stereotypes many
Indians and Fijians hold of one another").
77. Lal, supra note 10, at 85-88.
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the focus of their demands was on the Europeans who had
political rights and political power, not the native Fijians who
likewise were excluded from the franchise. The Fijian Indians
appealed both to a historic promise of equal treatment made at
the beginning of the indenture system and to general principles. 78
The British offered only modest concessions, granting a limited
franchise to elect three Indian members to a Legislative Council
which had six elected European members and three appointed
Fijian members. 79 The Indians objected that any assignment of
seats on the basis of race was discriminatory and unjust, and
that a system which gave the Europeans such a disproportionate
share of power was patently unfair. They continued to press their
demands for equality in whatever fora they could find. During
World War II, for example, Indian leaders urged their followers
not to serve in the army unless they were given the same pay
and treatment as European soldiers.'
During the postwar period, Fijian Indian leaders urged that
Fiji adopt a system of self-government consistent with democratic
principles.8' In the early 1960s, as it became clear that some
sort of expanded electoral system would be introduced in Fiji as
a step towards self-government, they organized a political party,
the Federation Party (later the National Federation Party or
NFP), which attracted the vast majority of Indian voters, but
very few native Fijian or European voters, for the next two
decades.8 2
The native Fijian political experience was quite different. Early
on, the Fijian leaders expressed fear of Indian political power,
indeed Indian domination, even before Fijian Indians outnum-
bered native Fijians. As the population trends became clearer,
Fijian fears increased.' Unlike the Fijian Indians, the native
Fijian leaders generally did not resent European political
superiority. They had come to trust that the colonial government
indeed would put Fijian interests first and would interpret these
interests as requiring the maintenance of traditional chiefly
authority84 To be sure, there had been conflicts between Fijians
78. A document known as the "Salisbury Despatch" was the basis of the Fijian
Indians' claim that there was a promise made. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 129-30.
79. Id. at 141-42.
80. See GILLION, CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINANCE, supra note 10, at 177-78.
81. Ali, supra note 10, at 20-22.
82. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 176-77; Alley, supra note 10, at 42-45.
83. Ali, supra note 10, at 7, 12-14.
84. Id. at 8.
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and the European settlers who had pressed during the early years
of the colony for policies and institutions more favorable to
European interests. But, in the 1930s, the Europeans too began
to feel threatened by the Indians and saw the strategic
advantages of alliance with the native Fijians. 5 Previously, the
Europeans had seen the principle of the paramountcy of Fijian
interests as an obstacle to "rational" development (for example,
with regard to land ownership); now they treated it as a rallying
cry. So a political alliance between Europeans and native Fijians
began to develop.'
Native Fijian leaders were content with Fiji's status as a colony;
in fact, the British pushed them towards independence. Fijian
leaders did not yearn for democracy. They feared it as corrosive
of traditional patterns of rule. 7 Native Fijian leaders themselves
had insisted on the maintenance of a separate Fijian administra-
tion.' They did not press for the franchise, and they resisted
it until it became inevitable. 89
During World War II, native Fijian leaders, in contrast to the
Fijian Indian leaders, encouraged young men to join the British
army without demanding equal pay or equal treatment with the
Europeans. A substantial number volunteered, fought bravely,
and returned to form the core of the Fijian armed forces. This
historical experience was a major factor contributing to the
continued predominance of native Fijians in the Fijian armed
services.'
So far I have spoken primarily about the native Fijian leaders.
What about ordinary native Fijians? Did they share these
attitudes? Certainly some did not. Some native Fijians resented
the Fijian administration which constrained them in ways that
the other inhabitants of Fiji were not.9' Some resented the
privileges of the Europeans -their social, political, and economic
domination. But when it came time to vote, they supported
their chiefs. 92 The native Fijians were enfranchised at the
national level in 1963, 93 and, in the limited elections that
85. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 140-41.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 159; see Alley, supra note 10, at 28.
88. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 91-93.
89. See id. at 158-94; Alley, supra note 10, at 28-40.
90. See LAL, POWER AND PREJUDICE, supra note 10, at 55; MACNAUGHT, supra note 10,
at 148-51.
91. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 117-23; MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 110-11.
92. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 165-67, 180-83; Alley, supra note 10, at 47-48.
93. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 158.
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followed, they supported their traditional rulers even in the
face of some challenges by other Fijians. 94
E. Transition to Independence
The political reforms introduced by the British made it clear
that constitutional change and ultimately independence were
inevitable in Fiji. 95 In response, the Fijian chiefs began to
organize a political party. Initially, the primary goal of the party
was to persuade the British to adopt a constitutional system that
would protect Fijian interests by entrenching native Fijian
political superiority, including a formal guarantee that native
Fijians would have an absolute majority in the legislature. 6
When it became clear that the British would not provide such
a guarantee, the native Fijian leader Ratu Mara developed a
strategy of creating a larger party with at least some support
in all the ethnic communities of Fiji by creating alliances with
other political organizations, including that of an Indian political
rival of the National Federation Party.9" The central core of
support, however, was the native Fijian community. This party,
the Alliance Party, has received the vast majority of native Fijian
votes from the beginning of native Fijian participation in electoral
politics.
98
In 1965, a constitutional conference was held in London with
the participation of representatives of the three key ethnic groups
in Fiji.99 The British had hoped to develop an institutional
arrangement for elections that would be acceptable to all, but
the Fijian Indians insisted on a common electoral roll for voters
and candidates, which the native Fijians and the Europeans
rejected completely. The British finally introduced a modification
of the previous arrangement of communal voting by increasing
the number of seats for Fijians and Indians and by including some
94. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 166-67, 180-83.
95. Alley, supra note 10, at 28-29.
96. Id. at 32-33.
97. Id. at 34-40.
98. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 207-08; Lal, supra note 10, at 95-96. The Alliance
Party's hold on Fijian voters was challenged seriously only once-in 1977, by the Fijian
Nationalist Party, which took a much harder line on the issue of Fijian superiority and
indeed demanded the deportation of Indians from Fiji to India. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 124-25.
99. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 171.
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seats in which the candidates had to come from a specific
community (Fijian, Indian, or "General," that is, other races),
but all voters could vote for them."° The NFP denounced the
arrangement because it continued to provide a strikingly
disproportionate number of seats to the European population and
maintained the principle of racial identification of all candi-
dates.'' In the subsequent election in 1966, the NFP won all
nine of the Indian communal seats but lost all of the "cross-
voting" seats. 1 2 Overall, the Alliance won twenty-three seats
and gained enough of the Indian vote to give some credence to
its claim to be a multiracial party, though not enough to call into
question the credentials of the NFP as the representative of the
Indian community.
10 3
The immediate aftermath of the 1966 election was marked by
confrontation and bitterness. The Indian representatives soon
boycotted the Legislative Council. Their seats were declared
forfeit, and by-elections were held in 1968 in an atmosphere of
racial tension and threats of violence."° The NFP again won all
the seats. 05 Then things changed very quickly. Leaders of both
groups seem to have become concerned about the possibility of
deep and widespread racial confrontations. In addition, the leader
of the NFP died and was replaced by someone more inclined to
compromise. The leaders of the two parties engaged in
discussions which led quickly to a new constitution and
independence in 1970."°
F. The 1970 Constitution
The new constitution, like the old, was built upon the principle
of racial representation. It established a bicameral system based
upon the Westminster model, but with a special role for the Upper
House or Senate. The Senate had twenty-two members: seven
nominated by the Prime Minister, six by the Leader of the
Opposition, and one by the Council of Rotuma. The remaining
100. Id. at 171-72.
101. Id. at 172-73.
102. Id. at 176, 180.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 181-83.
105. Id. at 183.
106. Id. at 184.
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eight were nominated by the Council of Chiefs, and they had
effective veto power over an important range of legislation. No
substantive changes could be made with regard to citizenship,
the composition of parliament or the judiciary, or key legislation
affecting native Fijians without the support of three-quarters
of both Houses. 1 7 In addition, legislation affecting "Fijian land,
customs or customary rights" required the support of at least six
of the eight Council of Chiefs nominees." s Thus, the Senate
institutionalized protections for chiefly authority and established
Fijian rights and interests in key areas.
The House of Representatives had fifty-two seats. For twenty-
seven of these seats, the communal seats, both the candidate and
the voters were segregated by race. Thus, the Fijians had twelve
seats for which only Fijians could vote, the Indians twelve seats
for which only Indians could vote, and those who were neither
Fijian nor Indian had three seats reserved for their voters. For
the other twenty-five seats, the national seats, the candidates
were to be selected on the basis of race, but elected by voters of
all races. Of these, ten seats were reserved for Fijians, ten for
Indians, and five for the "General Electorate."'"
This complex system was apparently designed with two goals
in mind. First, the communal seats were intended to guarantee
that each of the major ethnic groups would have some representa-
tives looking out for its interests (as defined by the voters within
the group itself)." 0 Second, the national seats were intended to
encourage political parties to form alliances across racial lines."'
For example, the NFP, which appealed primarily to Indians, had
to find native Fijians willing to run under its banner in order
even to contest the Fijian national seats in constituencies where
Fijian Indians constituted a majority of the voters. It followed
that each major party was likely to have members in its caucus
who did not belong to the dominant racial group in the party."2
On the whole, the system appears to have achieved the first
goal but not the second, at least not in a substantive sense. It
is true that both parties nominated and elected candidates from
the other racial group, but these candidates had only a marginal
107. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 188; Lal, supra note 10, at 76-77.
108. FIJI CONST. § 68(2) (1970), reprinted in 1 THE LAWS OF FIJI 17,58 (Harold Picton-
Smith ed., rev. ed. 1978).
109. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 187; Lal, supra note 10, at 76.
110. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 195; Lal, supra note 10, at 76.
111. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 172.
112. See id. at 194.
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impact on the policies, rhetoric, and voter support of the parties.
113
A native Fijian elected almost entirely with Indian votes was
simply not a credible representative of the Fijian community;
so too for Fijian Indians elected with Fijian votes. The major
exception to this situation occurred when the candidate represented
some disaffected subgroup; for example, Indian Muslims sometimes
supported the Alliance Party rather than the Hindu-dominated
NFP. 1
4
The first election under the new constitution came in 1972,
and, as in 1966, the results were a substantial victory for the
Alliance Party, which won thirty-three of the fifty-two seats.
Again, voting was divided overwhelmingly along ethnic lines,
but the Alliance Party was able to make significant inroads into
the Fijian Indian vote, averaging almost twenty-four percent of
the vote in the Indian communal seats, and perhaps even more
in some of the cross-voting national constituencies." 5 In addition,
the Alliance won four of the five seats reserved for candidates
from the "General Electorate." By contrast, the NFP was able
to win only about four percent of the native Fijian vote in the
Fijian communal seats and perhaps as much as ten percent in
the cross-voting seats. It fared little better with the voters from
the "General Electorate."" 6 For the Alliance Party, then, the
results of this first election suggested that the 1970 constitution
would guarantee it continued political success. So long as it could
maintain its solid support among native Fijians and the General
Electorate, it seemed virtually to be assured of a parliamentary
majority with only modest support from Fijian Indians."
17
There were, however, two flaws to this way of thinking: one
of principle and one of practical judgment. In the negotiations
leading to independence, the two major parties had agreed that
113. See id. at 197.
114. See id. at 145-47.
115. Id. at 198-99.
116. Id.
117. The Alliance Party could count on the 12 Fijian communal seats and the three
seats controlled by voters from the General Electorate. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at
198. In addition, half of the national cross-voting constituencies presumably would have
a majority of voters who were native Fijians or General Electors, because these groups
constituted roughly half of the electorate. In fact, because of the geographical separation
of the two major ethnic groups, see Premdas, supra note 54, at 123, 125, most of the
constituencies were dominated by one group or the other, with only a few likely to offer
any opportunity for a close contest, even if the Alliance Party's support from Fijian Indian
voters should decline. The three General Electorate seats thus provided a crucial buffer
in the event that the Alliance Party should lose one or two of the constituencies that
were closely divided between voters from the two major ethnic groups.
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the arrangement for the House of Representatives would be
regarded as an interim arrangement, valid only for the first
general election. 18 Both parties' leaders agreed to the appoint-
ment of a Royal Commission to work out a permanent electoral
system for the House. 119 It recommended that the system of
communal seats be retained because ethnic identity was such
a deep and pervasive feature of Fijian society that it was essential
to provide some sense of security to whichever major group was
in the minority and to the smaller minorities as well.12 But the
commission also recommended that the racial restrictions on the
candidates for the twenty-five national seats be removed, and
that five multimember constituencies be established and elected
based on Single Transfer Vote. Apparently, the commission
believed that this approach offered some hope for transcending
the pattern of racially divided politics.' 2 ' It was also clearly a
step in the direction of the common roll which Indians had been
demanding for decades. The governing Alliance Party rejected
the recommendations, partly out of the long-standing Fijian
antipathy to a common roll and partly because the Alliance Party
had been successful under the "interim" arrangement and the
political implications of this new proposal were unclear. The
leader of the NFP regarded this rejection as the betrayal of a
moral commitment to accept the recommendations of the commis-
sion, and relations between the two parties once again deteriorat-
ed.
122
The Alliance Party's judgment about the advantages of the
prevailing arrangement proved flawed in the next election when
its hegemony over the native Fijian vote was challenged. One
challenge came from a western Fijian chief who represented the
long-standing grievances of native Fijians from that region
against the eastern establishment. He managed to win the Fijian
communal seat in his region." The other challenge came from
the formation of the Fijian Nationalist Party and was far more
serious in terms of its potential to make inroads among the entire
native Fijian electorate. Adopting slogans like "Fiji for the
Fijians," this party advocated Fijian supremacy and even the
118. Lal, supra note 10, at 77.
119. This commission, the Street Commission, was appointed in 1975. See id. at 78.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 77-79.
123. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 211.
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deportation of the Indian population. 24 The Fijian Nationalist
Party received considerable popular support in the election of
March/April 1977, winning one of the Fijian communal seats,
gaining an average of almost twenty-five percent of the vote in
the Fijian communal seats overall, and splitting Fijian ranks in
some of the cross-voting national seats.'25 To meet this challenge,
the Alliance Party adopted much stronger ethnic rhetoric in its
appeals to native Fijians. This tactic and fear of the Fijian
Nationalist Party drove some of the Fijian Indian voters away
from the Alliance Party, reducing its support from twenty-five
to fifteen percent."2 The result of these dynamics was that the
NFP emerged with twenty-six seats to the Alliance's twenty-four
and one apiece for the two dissident Fijian groups.127 The Alliance
Party's ability to maintain so many seats despite these challenges
to its base is indicative of the advantages of the existing system
for the Party. Infighting and political ineptitude prevented the
NFP from forming the new government," but the lesson was
clear. The existing constitution did not guarantee native Fijian
control of parliament."
G. The 1987 Election and the Coup
When the NFP failed to form a government quickly in 1977,
a caretaker government was established and new elections called
which the Alliance Party won handily, due to great divisions
within the NFP and the return of most native Fijian voters to
its camp.3 ° It won again in 1982, but with a reduced majority
of only four seats.' In the wake of that election, the Council
of Chiefs passed a resolution calling for the reservation of two-
thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives and of the
positions of prime minister and governor general for native
Fijians.
1 32
124. Id. at 205.
125. Id. at 209, 213.
126. Id. at 209-13.
127. Id. at 209.
128. See id. at 214-15.
129. Id. at 201-20.
130. The Alliance Party successfully argued that disunity among native Fijians would
give victory to the party of the Fijian Indians. See id. at 217-19.
131. Id. at 231-32.
132. Id.
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In 1985, the Fiji Trade Union Congress formed a new Labour
Party with a native Fijian, Timoci Bavadra, as its leader. The
two major parties had both adopted multiracial rhetoric at times
in the past, but had built their electoral bases and constructed
their strongest electoral appeals on ethnic grounds. By contrast,
Labour's ultimate goal was to make common cause among the
disadvantaged in Fiji, both native Fijians and Fijian Indians.
To this end, it criticized both existing parties as dominated by
economic and social elites insensitive to the concerns of ordinary
people. It advocated a democratic socialist program that became
more moderate over time but was clearly to the left of the other
parties. As part of its program of social reform, the Labour Party
explicitly attacked the existing administration of native lands,
charging that it served primarily the interests of a privileged
few. 133
Despite its avowed multiracialism, the leadership role of some
native Fijians in the party, and its appeal to some urban middle
class native Fijians, Labour drew most of its initial strength from
Fijian Indians, in part because the NFP, the traditional home
of Fijian Indian voters, was still divided and in disarray and in
part because many more Indians than native Fijians belonged
to the trade unions which had founded the party. Moreover, most
of its criticisms were aimed, not surprisingly, at the government
and the party that had been in power for the previous fifteen
years. Equally unsurprising, the Alliance Party labelled it an
Indian party, arguing that Bavadra and other native Fijians in
leadership roles were figureheads, fronting for Indian interests.'
This argument was all the easier to make when the Labour Party
entered a coalition with the remnants of the NFP to contest the
1987 election. Labour entered the coalition because it feared that
running separately would split the anti-Alliance vote and
guarantee a sweeping Alliance victory. Labour saw defeat of the
Alliance as the top political priority, and the NFP agreed to accept
a lesser role in the Coalition.1
35
The Coalition won the 1987 election, taking twenty-eight seats
to the Alliance's twenty-four. 3  As in previous elections, the
133. See HOWARD, supra note 10, at 146-206; LAWSON, supra note 10, at 234-41.
134. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 234-35.
135. See id. at 239-41.
136. Id. at 250; see also HOWARD, supra note 10, at 223-24,377-99 (providing a more
detailed breakdown of the various Fijian voting districts). Of the 28 elected Coalition
representatives, 19 were Fijian Indians, 2 were General Electors, and 7 were native
Fijians. Id. at 223. Fourteen of the total came from Labour and 14 from the NFP. The
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voters divided largely along ethnic lines. Although it is not
possible to know exactly the ethnic voting patterns in the cross-
voting constituencies, it is easy to see in the communal seats.
In those, the Coalition gained, on average, only about 9.6% of
the native Fijian vote.13 7 The Coalition actually gained fewer
total votes than the Alliance,"3 but it won all four national seats
in which the electorate was fairly closely divided between native
Fijians and Fijian Indians. In all the other constituencies, the
margin was on the order of two to one for one ethnic group or
the other, and each of these went along ethnic lines.'39
The election results led to some public protests, even rioting,
by native Fijians, but things seemed to be settling down as the
new Prime Minister, Bavadra, and his government appeared to
take control. Then, a month after the election, the Fijian army
staged a bloodless coup whose goal was, or quickly became, the
firm establishment of native Fijian political hegemony."4 Fiji
has now severed its links with the British Commonwealth,
established a republic, and adopted a new constitution that
guarantees native Fijians a significant majority of the seats in
Parliament, eliminates cross-voting, and strengthens the power
of the chiefly establishment in the Senate.'
4'
II. THE MORALITY OF CULTURAL PRESERVATION:
THE LESSONS OF FIJI?
If there is one point that leaps out from a history of Fiji, it is
that efforts to preserve native Fijian culture against the pressures
of modern liberal economic and political institutions and values
cabinet was heavily weighted towards Labour, and much more evenly divided ethnically.
Including Bavadra, the Coalition Prime Minister, it contained 10 (later 11) members
from Labour and 4 from the NFP. Of these, 6 (and later a seventh) were native Fijians
(including Bavadra), 7 were Fijian Indians, and 1 was a General Elector of part European
and part native Fijian origin. Id. at 229; see also LAL, POWER AND PREJUDICE, supra note
10, at 12 (listing the members of the coalition cabinet and their party affiliations).
137. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 251.
138. LAL, COUPS IN PARADISE, supra note 10, at 185.
139. See HOWARD, supra note 10, at 224-26; LAWSON, supra note 10, at 250-52.
140. There were actually two coups, one in May 1987 and a second one in September
1987; however, for the purposes of this Article, I am referring to them as a single coup.
For a more detailed discussion of the coups, see HOWARD, supra note 10, at 243-340; LAL,
COUPS IN PARADISE, supra note 10, at 192-207; LAL, POWER AND PREJUDICE, supra note 10,
at 77-90, 116-23; LAWSON, supra note 10, at 255-59, 263.
141. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 289-90.
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lie at the heart of the story. But what conclusions should we
draw from this? What does Fiji tell us about the morality of
trying to preserve threatened cultures? To some, no doubt, the
principal lesson will be the dangers of such attempts. To pursue
cultural preservation is to emphasize cultural or ethnic identity.
The coup in Fiji just confirms the worst fears of those opposed
to the politics of identity: that it will legitimate the domination
of those defined as "other," the ones who are not members of one's
own group. Even if a cultural minority is not in a position to
dominate, emphasis on identity will undermine the unity of the
political community as a whole and, more importantly from a
liberal perspective, will make it harder for individuals to define
and to redefine themselves as they see fit.
There is a lot to be said for this view, but I think that it misses
something important as well. When North Americans think of
indigenous peoples, we tend to think of people conquered by the
violence or ensnared by the deceit of European settlers and their
descendants, people decimated by disease and driven from their
lands, now impoverished and powerless minorities in countries
overwhelmingly populated by the descendants of immigrants from
other places. That has been the fate of indigenous peoples in
North America and elsewhere, including Australia and New
Zealand. 142
By comparison with these other indigenous peoples, native
Fijians appear to enjoy an enviable situation. Their numbers,
after an initial period of decline in the colonial era, stabilized
and grew, and the most recent census showed that native Fijians
constituted almost half of the population of Fiji. 3 Even before
the coup and apart from the army, they have been relatively
powerful in political affairs, especially in the decades since
independence. If they have not achieved as much success in economic
endeavours as other segments of the population, they have
enjoyed a relatively secure material and social life. They certainly
have not suffered from the extreme social disintegration-high
142. Australia and New Zealand were colonies that the European settlers in Fiji took
as models, hoping that the colonial government in Fiji would adopt policies encouraging
European settlement and leading to the development of Fiji along similar lines. See
LAWSON, supra note 10, at 57; MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 1-2, 13; Ali, supra note 10,
at 3. Had this course been followed, it seems highly doubtful that native Fijians would
have fared as well as they did under the policies actually adopted. See generally HENRY
REYNOLDS, TE LAW OF ThE LAND (1987), HENRY REYNOLDS, TvE OTHER SIDE OF ThE FRONTIER
(1982).
143. See supra note 55.
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rates of unemployment, crime, alcoholism, and suicide-that
has befallen many other indigenous groups.
It seems reasonable to attribute much of the present situation
of native Fijians, and hence their relative well-being, to the fact
that native Fijians have been able to maintain a relatively stable
and coherent collective way of life over the last century or so.
That fact in turn seems due in significant measure to the policies
of cultural preservation pursued in Fiji. Moreover, it seems
plausible to suppose that policies more in keeping with liberal
individualism-for example an insistence on individual, alienable
title to land as opposed to the collective, inalienable form of
ownership adopted in Fiji-might have had disastrous conse-
quences for native Fijians as such policies did elsewhere. But,
if one accepts these claims, it would seem hard to conclude (at
least without further discussion) that efforts at cultural preserva-
tion, even when this goes against the grain of liberal institutions,
are always a bad idea from a moral point of view.
What makes the case of Fiji particularly rich and rewarding
for purposes of theoretical reflection is its moral complexities and
ambiguities. There are two groups in conflict here and both
arouse our moral sympathies-at least they do mine. The Fijian
Indians are the descendants of victims of an exploitative colonial
labor system and a system of colonial rule that unjustly privileged
Europeans over them. I admire the struggles and achievements
of the Fijian Indians. Because their own appeals to liberal
democratic principles are rooted in a history of challenges to
European domination, I do not see how one could treat them as
ideological rationales for the perpetuation of privilege. Instead,
their liberal democratic principles appear as critical and
constructive ideals-connected to the interests of the Fijian
Indians, to be sure, but moral principles that have to be taken
seriously.
On the other hand, the native Fijians appear in some respects
to be an even more vulnerable and threatened group, given the
history of indigenous peoples in the modern world. If one cares
about human well-being, one has to worry about what makes
people end up as badly off as most indigenous peoples and to ask
what might prevent such a fate. The situation of the native
Fijians invites reflection on one possible avenue of escape.
The attempt to preserve a distinctive Fijian way of life also
opens a fruitful avenue for reflection upon the liberal commitment
to pluralism. How open is liberalism, both in theory and in
practice? What sorts of difference should liberals respect as a
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way of affirming a commitment to equality, what sorts should
they tolerate or accommodate, and what sorts should they
preclude or reject? The answers to these questions are contested
strongly, and I do not propose to try to settle all of those
arguments here. But if liberals are ever going to be open to, even
supportive of, nonliberal cultures and ways of life, it seems likely
to happen in this sort of case where a traditional, nonliberal
culture seems to be, or to have been, both viable and good for
most of those who shared it and where it would be very costly
in terms of human well-being if the culture were to disintegrate
either from lack of support or from a deliberate (but unsuccessful)
attempt at transformation. Yet the steps taken to preserve that
culture do conflict in important ways with liberal institutions
and ideals. So, exploration of this case may reveal a lot about
liberalism and difference.
We cannot simply affirm or oppose cultural preservation on
the basis of the Fiji story. Instead, we have to think more deeply
about the case to see whether there are ways to reconcile our
apparently conflicting sympathies for both groups. Can one
criticize the coup but endorse institutions and practices that
contributed to the sense of ethnic identity that lay behind the
coup? Can one endorse an ideal of equal citizenship and insist
that Fijian Indians are morally entitled to be treated as equal
citizens, yet still defend the constitutional entrenchment of certain
rights and privileges for the native Fijians? I will argue for an
affirmative answer, with qualifications, to both these questions
and try to show how they illuminate some of the issues in the
debate over cultural preservation.
III. WHO Is ENTITLED TO EQUAL CITIZENSHIP?
A. The Citizenship of the Fijian Indians
I begin with a defense of the Fijian Indians' claim to equal
citizenship and a critique of the coup. These are the points on
which I would expect the least resistance from readers of this
Journal, but one can never be sure these days about the people
who read, and write for, law journals. Besides, the arguments
on these matters will allow me to bring out some important points
about cultural relativism and the moral relevance of history.
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The slogan of the Fijian Nationalist Party, "Fiji for the Fijians,"
expresses the view of many native Fijians including those who
supported the coup and the subsequent political reforms
entrenching native Fijian hegemony. In this view, the Fijian
Indians should be regarded as second-class citizens at best,
perhaps even as temporary visitors to be returned to India or
sent elsewhere as soon as possible. For many native Fijians, the
fact that they are descended from the original inhabitants of the
islands has been central to their self-understanding, their
identity, their sense of themselves.' 44 The centrality of land in
Fijian culture suggests an attachment which goes far beyond its
instrumental use and which is tied up with this sense of self.
They care about Fiji and feel that it is rightly theirs. They are
the Fijians. The others who live there are outsiders, immigrants,
even if they were born and raised there. They place great weight
on the Deed of Cession, the agreement which established Fiji as
a colony and which, according to their interpretation, included
a historic promise by the British government that their interests
would be paramount.' 45 In the native Fijians' view, this promise
implicitly acknowledged that those who came to Fiji from other
places and their descendants would not have the same sort of
claim to membership.'"
The Indians in Fiji have a far more ambivalent attitude toward
the land where they live. Virtually all of them were born and
raised there, and in many cases their parents and grandparents
were as well. 147 Certainly they do not belong anywhere else.
They would not fit in traditional Indian village society, and few
have any desire to live in India. On the other hand, they
generally see Fiji as a land where their recent ancestors lived
in harsh bondage, where their own contributions have never been
acknowledged fully, and where they are still regarded as
outsiders. Though they know of no other home, many do not feel
144. See LASAQA, supra note 10, at 22.
145. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 58-60.
146. See id.; SCARR, FIJI: A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 10, at 100-03,138-43. The
Deed of Cession itself was actually unconditional and contained no explicit references
to the paramountcy of Fijian interests. Nevertheless, Gordon, the first governor, claimed
that oral assurances to this effect had been given to the Fijians, and he and later officials
interpreted it in this way, so that it has become a formal convention, recognized in
legislative acts and in the preamble to the 1970 Constitution, to read the Deed as pro-
viding some recognition of and guarantee for the special position of indigenous Fijians.
See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 58-59.
147. By the early 1960s, over 90% of the Fijian Indians had been born in Fiji. MAYER,
INDIANS IN FIJI, supra note 10, at viii.
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Fiji to be home.'" For many, India, or an idealized conception
of India, is far more central to their identity than Fiji. Their
relation to Fiji is far more instrumental than that of the native
Fijians. Although some Indians call themselves Fijians in some
contexts, many use the term exclusively for native Fijians.49
Many more Fijian Indians than native Fijians emigrate, although
the number is small. 50 More would probably go if they could
get into Australia or Canada or the United States, where there
would be greater economic opportunities than in Fiji.
Do these differences between Fijian Indians and native Fijians
matter for the question of who ought to be a full citizen, entitled
to equal rights and equal treatment within the political
community of Fiji? The Fijian Indians say no. Like the native
Fijians, they appeal in part to a historic promise by a British
colonial official, in their case the Salisbury Despatch of 1875,
which pledged that if the government of India would support the
recruitment of Indian indentured labor for other British colonies,
then Indian settlers, after completing their term of indenture,
would enjoy "privileges no whit inferior to those of any other class
of Her Majesty's subjects resident in the colony."' 5 ' But they
appeal also to liberal democratic principles. They are morally
entitled, they say, to be treated as full members and equal
citizens, in no way inferior to the native Fijians.
52
I agree completely with the claim of the Fijian Indians. They
ought to be treated as equal citizens. But my response is, in the
first instance, an intuitive one. I will try to defend my view, but
I should say at the outset that I have more confidence in the
judgment than in the theory that I provide to justify it. To put
it another way, whatever the limits of the positive argument I
am about to offer, I suspect that most people will share my
148. See Ahmed Ali, Indians in Fiji, in THE INDO-FIJIAN EXPERIENCE 3, 23-24
(Subramani ed., 1979); Raymond Pillai, Labourer's Lament, reprinted inTHE INDO-FmIIAN
EXPERIENCE, supra, at 160.
149. See generally supra note 50.
150. BAYLISS-SMrTH ET AL., supra note 10, at 153.
151. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 130 (quoting Public (Emigration) Despatch to India,
no. 39 (Mar. 24, 1875) (emphasis omitted)). Unfortunately for this argument, the
government of India did not agree to cooperate in the proposed schemes, so the status
of the promise was clouded. Some have argued that it was a contingent promise and
so no longer binding when the government of India rejected the offer. Others have argued
that the promise of equal status was a background presupposition of all arrangements
for indentured labor, and they cite subsequent administrative reports to support this
claim. Id. at 128-31.
152. The arguments by Fijian Indians go back to their long struggle for a common
roll. See GILLION, CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINANCE, supra note 10, at 136.
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intuitive judgment and I doubt that anyone will be able to offer
a good argument against equal citizenship for the Fijian Indians.
B. Moral Limits to Historical Appeals:
The Deed of Cession
To begin with, I do not think that the appeal of the native
Fijians to the Deed of Cession's supposed guarantee that their
interests would be kept paramount plausibly can be used as a
justification for the subordination or expulsion of the Fijian
Indians, because if the guarantee meant what some Fijians have
claimed that it meant, the British had no right to make such a
promise. If A promises B to keep C and C's descendants in
perpetual servitude in return for a promise by B to obey A, this
promise provides no compelling moral reason for perpetuating
the servitude of C and her descendants, if that servitude is itself
unjust. In other words, a promise to do wrong deserves no moral
respect and justifies nothing. So, to rely on the Deed of Cession's
guarantee as a moral justification for the treatment of Fijian
Indians, one would have to show that the British were morally
justified in not treating the Fijian Indians equally.
I do not think, however, that Gordon and the others who
promulgated the idea that the Deed of Cession guaranteed the
paramountcy of Fijian interests actually intended the sort of
dominance by native Fijians that some later interpreters have
claimed that the Deed warrants. The real issue at the time was
whether the interests of the European settlers would override
any serious concern for the indigenous Fijians. Understood
properly as a commitment to protect the Fijians against
domination and exploitation by European settlers, the doctrine
of the paramountcy of Fijian interests was morally defensible
and indeed desirable. But such a commitment would not warrant
any action towards the Fijian Indians, who were themselves
clearly subjected to domination and exploitation by the European
settlers in Fiji. Even if one argued that the British importation
of Indian laborers violated the promise to protect the native
Fijians' interests (an argument that is deeply problematic, given
the crucial role of the Indians in preventing the exploitation of
Fijian labor on the plantations and in contributing to the
economic development of the island), it would not follow that the
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Fijians would be justified in treating the Indians as less than
equal citizens, much less in expelling them."'3
C. Justice and Citizenship
One way to think about the issue is to ask what justice
requires, if anything, with regard to the citizenship status of
native Fijians and Fijian Indians. Of course, a great deal of
contemporary writing about justice starts with the assumption
that the issue of membership in the political community is settled
and the only question is what citizens owe one another." 4 But
the case of Fiji shows why the question of who belongs also is
vital. So, how should we think about that question?
The question has two parts: (1) who is entitled to citizenship?
and (2) what sorts of citizenship are people entitled to? With
regard to the first, I submit that, at a minimum, anyone born
and brought up within the borders of a modern state is morally
entitled to citizenship in that state.'55 Even for one not born and
153. One of the familiar moral conundrums of the real world is the fact that those
in power often are able to arrange circumstances so that oppressed groups are pitted
against one another. For example, landless peasants in Brazil now are encouraged by
the powerful, including some governmental officials, to clear and settle land in the Amazon
basin, displacing the indigenous people who have traditionally lived in that area. Lansing
R. Shepard, Vanishing Rain Forest, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 2, 1986, at 18. Is it wrong
for the peasants to take over these lands? Speaking broadly, I think that the answer
is yes, but it is easy to see why the peasants act as they do and hard to criticize them
because they too are so clearly victims. Assume, for the sake of this argument, the
following (which I take to be largely true but will not try to prove): The peasants are
landless because most of the arable land is in the hands of a tiny, powerful elite. This
is a highly unjust distribution, but land reform is not feasible because of the power of
the rich landowners. The peasants are hungry, needy, and desperate, but any attempt
to wrest land from the wealthy, though morally justifiable, would be doomed to failure.
Taking the land of the Indians, which no doubt seems underutilized from the peasants'
perspective as well as from that of the central government, is the only realistic option
for them to improve their very bad situation. It is not justifiable, but it is perhaps morally
excusable in a way that the behavior of the landowners is not, though their behavior,
too, is perfectly understandable from the perspective of self-interest.
154. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 9, at 8.
155. I recognize, of course, that this principle is not part of international law and
is not compatible with the citizenship laws of many countries, such as Germany, which
does not grant citizenship as of right to the children of immigrants, even when those
children have been born and brought up in Germany. I regard the German citizenship
policy as morally indefensible. See Joseph H. Carens, Membership and Morality: Admis-
sion to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLrics OF CmI-
ZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORM AMERCA 31,31-49 (William R Brubaker ed., 1989) [hereinaf-
ter IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP]. For a defense of the German citizenship
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raised in a state, the longer one's residence, the stronger one's
moral claim to belong and hence one's moral claim to citizenship.
By these criteria, virtually all of the Fijian Indians have very
strong claims to citizenship. With regard to the second question,
I submit that citizenship in the modern state must be treated
as a threshold concept. Once over the threshold, one is entitled
to be treated as an equal. No modern state may legitimately have
different ranks of citizenship. There should be no second-class
citizens. To be a citizen ought to mean that one is an equal
citizen. Hence, Fijian Indians must be treated as full members
and equal citizens of Fiji. In support of both these claims, I will
appeal both to abstract principles and to concrete intuitive judg-
ments that I think are widely shared.
1. Who Belongs?-The first claim is the harder one to defend
because it is less central to political theory and practice. But
think of cases where a state has excluded people born and raised
in the community from citizenship. Nazi Germany did it under
the Nuremburg Laws. South Africa did it under apartheid.
These were not the worst evils of either regime by any means,
but surely their policies of exclusion from citizenship on the basis
of race, religion, and ethnicity were connected centrally to what
we find most morally abhorrent about those regimes. Of course,
many contemporary states have citizenship laws that do not grant
citizenship to everyone born and raised within its borders, and
these policies do not arouse the same intuitive moral outrage as
the policies of Nazi Germany and South Africa under apartheid.
But that is largely because the implications of the formal
citizenship policies are muted for the most part by other policies
and practices that acknowledge de facto many of the moral claims
of those born and raised within a state, especially their right to
stay and to be treated with respect and dignity. 6 Moreover, until
recently, the numbers of people in such a position typically have
been quite small and so not very visible.
law, see Kay Hailbronner, Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany, in IMMIGRATION AND
THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP, supra, at 67, 67-79.
156. For example, "guestworkers" and their descendants in Germany enjoy most of
the same social and economic rights that German citizens have, a fact that certainly
makes their lives better than they would be if these benefits were tied more tightly to
citizenship. The same separation of social, economic, and legal rights-apart from political
participation-from citizenship can be found in almost all Western industrialized countries.
See William R. Brubaker, Membership Without Citizenship: The Economic and Social
Rights of Noncitizens, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP, supra note 155,
at 145, 160-62.
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As a way of exploring your own intuitive sense of what justice
requires, ask yourself what your reaction would be if Germany
were to expel the hundreds of thousands of people born and raised
in Germany by Turkish or Yugoslav or other immigrant parents.
My own reaction is that any such expulsion would be morally
reprehensible. But why? After all, the people in question are
not citizens or entitled to citizenship in Germany under German
or international law. Yet the Germans have not expelled them,
even selectively on the basis of employment, despite some strong
economic incentives and increasing internal political pressure
to do so. 157 It is clear that many Germans think that it would
be morally wrong to expel these people. Again the question is
why?
One clue to the answer lies in language. These people are
described by the Germans as "second-generation immigrants,"
though they have never lived anywhere other than Germany and
sometimes speak no other language than German. Their children
are described as "third-generation immigrants."'58 But an
immigrant is someone who comes from somewhere else to live
in a new country, not someone born and raised there. The
parents or grandparents of these people were immigrants. They
are not. This oxymoronic language reveals the moral contradic-
tions at the heart of German policy. These people have a moral
right to stay in Germany because they have a vital human
interest in being able to continue to live in the community in
which they were born and raised. The Germans know this, and
this is why they cannot bring themselves to kick the people out.
But they cannot quite bring themselves to acknowledge that they
belong either, which is why they continue to call them "immi-
grants."
Any moral theory that claims to respect the moral equality of
persons will set severe limits on the moral right of the state to
expel inhabitants. The moral considerations that set limits on
the moral right of a state to deny citizenship to the children of
its current citizens or to strip people of citizenship and to expel
them also set limits on the expulsion of people who have lived
in a country all their lives, whatever their citizenship status.
Adults who have spent most of their lives in a community have
the same sort of moral right to stay, because they have the same
157. See Carens, supra note 155, at 33.
158. See Hailbronner, supra note 155, at 77 (referring to second- and third-generation
immigrants in Germany).
The Case of Fiji
584 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL.25:3 & 4
sort of interest at stake. 59 Moreover, if "second- and third-
generation immigrants" have a moral right to stay in Germany,
as even most Germans concede, they also have a moral right to
become German citizens if they choose, in part so that their moral
position as members of the community can receive formal, legal
acknowledgement and protection and in part so that they may
participate in political life, on the familiar liberal democratic
principle that people should not be governed without their
consent.
The Fijian Indians are legal citizens of Fiji. But even if they
were not, they would have a moral right to stay and to become
citizens. It would be wrong to expel them.
2. Equal Citizenship-If the first part of the argument is
granted-the right of the Fijian Indians to stay in Fiji and to keep
the Fijian citizenship that they possess-the second part-the
argument for equal citizenship-should be easier to establish.
Again, states like Nazi Germany and South Africa that have
openly rejected the principle of equal citizenship stand as the
archetypes of moral wrong. No one has to debate the merits of
their policies today. Of course, most Western states also denied
formal equality of citizenship on the basis of race, class, religion,
ethnicity, and gender in the not too distant past, but almost no
one defends these practices today or suggests that we should
return to them. On these issues there is a moral consensus, or
as close to a consensus as one gets.
The crucial abstract principle underlying this consensus is the
assumption of human moral equality, whether that is expressed
in terms of the moral equality of persons, in terms of equal
consideration of the interests of all individuals, or in some other
form. This assumption is central to the modern liberal tradition.
It is commonplace to argue that a commitment to the moral
equality of persons entails a commitment to equal political
citizenship." °
Of course, acceptance of the principle of equal citizenship does
not settle every question. What equality requires may be
contested hotly. The principle of equal citizenship may permit
or even require certain differences and distinctions among
159. The interest at stake is normally related to length of residence. There are
important questions of degree here, and difficult questions about where it is or is not
reasonable to draw a line. I am emphasizing clear cases, however, because length of
residence is not a serious issue for the Fijian Indians.
160. See RAWLS, supra note 9, at 221-28 (providing a distinguished example of this
commonplace argument).
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citizens. Indeed, I will argue below that it permits some of the
differences created by the 1970 Fijian constitution. 6' A commit-
ment to equality does not require us to ignore history. On the
contrary, it requires us to pay attention to history in trying to
judge what equality requires in particular circumstances. But
a commitment to equal citizenship does not permit, in my view,
a distinction among citizens on the basis of a difference in degrees
of attachment to the community (whether putative or real), much
less one that would purport to deduce that difference in
attachment from ethnic identification. And indeed, those who
cry "Fiji for the Fijians" are not claiming to articulate a view that
regards the Fijian Indians as equal citizens; they reject the
principle of equal citizenship. They are wrong to do so.
D. Justice and History
One of the questions that I am exploring in this Article is how
history matters in moral analysis because the preservation of
culture as a moral goal is obviously tied up with the claims of
history. Now in some ways my argument clearly limits the role
that history can play. The principle of equal citizenship means
that native Fijians cannot legitimately say that their interests
should count more than the interests of other citizens because
they, the native Fijians, are descended from the original
inhabitants of the islands while the other citizens are the
descendants of more recent arrivals. But my defense of the
principle of equal citizenship and of the Fijian Indians claim to
equal citizenship is not simply antihistorical. I have just noted
that historical factors may rightly influence ourjudgments about
what equality requires. It is important to note also that the
initial claim to a moral entitlement to citizenship is essentially
a historical claim. It is the particular history of the Fijian
Indians that establishes their moral claims in Fiji.
To explore the importance of this, it may be helpful to draw
attention briefly to other cases involving immigrants where my
own moral sense of who belongs and what justice requires is
somewhat different from the case of Fiji. Take the case of recent
French immigrants to New Caledonia. The number of Europeans
in New Caledonia has increased greatly in the last few decades,
161. See infra part V.B.
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with the result that nonnatives now outnumber natives. This
development was, at least in part, the outcome of a deliberate
policy by the French government encouraging immigration as
a way of forestalling any demand by the natives for independence.
In other words, it was a deliberate manipulation of the principles
of equal citizenship and majority rule to maintain French
hegemony over the island. 62
Suppose that a combination of native insurgency, international
pressures, and changing world conditions led to independence
for New Caledonia in the next few years. Would the recent
French immigrants be entitled to claim equal citizenship? Do
they belong? If it was wrong for the French government to have
encouraged and facilitated their arrival in the first place-and
from the story I have told, that seems clearly to be the case - does
the fact of their having arrived give them legitimacy? On the
one hand, there would be something perverse about rewarding
the French policy with moral recognition for the new settlers.
On the other hand, they are not soldiers obeying orders but
individuals with lives and claims of their own. Are they to be
held responsible for the policy? Should they have known better?
What about earlier arrivals who have been there for many years?
How about those of European descent who have been born and
brought up there? The latter, at least, belong and are entitled
to equal citizenship on the basis of my earlier analysis."8 But
if the French can delay long enough, a European majority will
have grown up in New Caledonia with just this sort of claim.
This illustrates one of the deep puzzles about the relation
between history and morality. On the one hand, if we simply
accept the claim that the passage of time reduces the moral
importance of the origins of a situation, we seem to create an
additional incentive for those who do not care about morality to
ignore it, namely, that over time those who care about morality
will feel less inclined, indeed less entitled, to try to do anything
about the injustice that has been perpetrated."8 On the other
162. Letter from Pierre Messmer, Prime Minister, to his secretary of state at the
French Overseas Department-Overseas Territories (1972), reprinted in MARC CoULON,
L'IRRUPTION KANAK DE CALDONIE A KANAKY 231 (1985).
163. See supra part III.C.
164. I cannot write these words today in the year of 1992 without thinking of the
Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing" in Serbia and Bosnia. Everything I read or see in
the media indicates an almost universal moral condemnation of this policy, yet most
of the current reports also suggest that many or most of the surviving victims of the policy
are unlikely to be able or willing to return to the areas from which they were expelled.
See, e.g., John F. Burns, Survivors of Fallen Bosnian Town Add to Refugees, N.Y. TIMES,
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hand, it seems problematic to penalize present generations for
what their ancestors have done.1" These questions arise with
respect to large minorities or even majorities introduced by other
imperial powers into lands with existing populations with a long-
standing cultural identity and tradition: the Chinese in Tibet
and the Russians in the Baltics, to cite only a few." I do not
feel as though I have a clear answer to such cases. Whether one
accepts or rejects the moral claims of the settlers, something of
moral value is lost. But however one answers these difficult
questions, they do not apply to the Fijian Indians, almost all of
whom were born and brought up in Fiji and have known no other
home.
Nov. 1, 1992, at A14. Diplomatic and economic sanctions are unlikely to last for long
after the fighting stops, and indeed, it is not even clear what the moral point of continuing
sanctions would be if there is no way to return the refugees. Perhaps the Serbians can
be compelled to pay compensation of some sort, but that would be a small price to pay,
from the Serbian perspective, to achieve the goals of their policy. Again, on most accounts
today, it seems as though the Serbians already have achieved their goals in a way that
could not be reversed except at greater human (and indeed moral) cost than the original
policy.
165. David Hume made an even stronger claim about the ways in which the passage
of time affects morality. He said, "Time and custom give authority to all forms of govern-
ment ... and that power, which at first was founded only on injustice and violence,
becomes in time legal and obligatory." DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 566
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., London, Clarendon Press 1888) (1739). Indeed, he argued that
time alters even our moral evaluation of a given event so that "a king, who during his
life-time might justly be deem'd an usurper, will be regarded by posterity as a lawful
prince" if his family keeps the throne. Id.
Israelis sometimes speak of building "facts on the ground" with their settlements on
the West Bank. See, e.g., Randolph Ryan, Hope -and Apprehension-Among Arabs on
Peace Talks, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14,1991, at 19. This refers, I think, notjust to sociologi-
cal facts but to moral facts. Over time, even people who opposed the settlements initially
may come to feel that it is not right to uproot those who have settled. This is not
necessarily a cynical manipulation of morality by those promoting the settlements, because
many Israelis feel the settlements are entirely justified morally but for reasons which
are not persuasive to others. The latter will, however, feel their moral views of what
justice requires shift the longer the settlements stay. In the same vein, some people
would say that it was not right to displace the Palestinians to create Israel, but now
that Israel exists and has existed for so long, it would be wrong not to accept its existence
as legitimate. Those who see the founding of Israel as fully justified from a moral point
of view might not be entirely happy with this qualified form of acceptance, but they would
nonetheless welcome the support it provides when others advance challenges to Israel's
basic existence. Of course, those now being displaced also are well aware of the ways
in which time will weaken their moral claims (in the eyes of others, not their own) and
so of the importance of resisting as vigorously as possible now, especially because they
can expect that the moral sympathy they now receive from outsiders will fade over time.
This is not a recipe for tranquility.
166. Small minorities do not pose quite the same kind of moral problem because
acknowledging their claims will not affect the fundamental identity of the political
community in the same way as acknowledging the claims of a new group with close to
a numerical majority.
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E. Democracy Versus Cultural Preservation?
I turn now to a critique of the coup, a relatively easy task if
what has preceded is accepted. Some people have attempted to
justify the coup on the grounds that it was necessary to preserve
traditional Fijian culture, especially the collective Fijian
ownership of land which was allegedly threatened by the new
government." 7 So far as I can tell, there is no reasonable
foundation for these allegations.
Some members of the new government, including the Fijian
prime minister, had criticized certain aspects of chiefly rule,
including the high incomes that some chiefs received from their
share of land revenues. Greater security for tenant farmers was
a long-standing and deep concern within the Fijian Indian
community and one that the new government might have tried
to address. And, reading between the lines, one might infer that
some of those associated with the new government regarded the
system of collective Fijian ownership of the land as outmoded
and unjust. But there is no evidence that the new government
had any intention of trying to alter the existing arrangements
with regard to land or that they would have had the capacity
to do anything, even if they so desired. As I noted above, Fijian
land rights and the other central elements of the traditional way
of life were constitutionally entrenched and the Council of Chiefs
had an effective veto power over any changes in these areas, both
substantively and procedurally through its veto over legislation
affecting the judiciary.'
To be sure, one easily can overstate the security provided by
constitutional guarantees. If those with political power are
unwilling to respect a constitution, its formal guarantees easily
can prove worthless. But again, there is no evidence at all that
the new government had any inclination not to respect the
constitution or any effective capacity not to do so. On the
contrary, it was the coup-makers who violated the constitution
by overthrowing a democratically elected government that had
167. For the most explicit attempt to defend the coup, see EDDIE DEAN & STAN RITOVA,
RABUKA: No OTHER WAY (1988). For a critique of these rationales, see LAWSON, supra
note 10, at 259-61.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
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operated scrupulously within the letter and spirit of the law.
In sum, ungrounded fears about threats to the Fijian way of
life did not and could not justify the coup.
169
IV. JUSTICE, MORAL RELATIVISM, AND CULTURAL
DIFFERENCE
One way to characterize my argument is to say that the
requirements ofjustice set moral limits to the pursuit of cultural
preservation as a goal. One obvious challenge to this line of
argument is to ask the question, "Whose justice?" 70 This raises
the issue of the relation between respect for cultural difference-
an ideal implicit in the goal of the preservation of minority
cultures-and moral relativism. If different cultures embody
different moral views, at least to some extent, isn't it a form
of cultural imperialism to use the standards of one culture
to judge another? Who are we to say what is just or unjust
in Fiji? Indeed, in resisting international criticism of the coup,
the most powerful line of argument that the native Fijians
have been able to advance has been the claim that any
169. Some may find my wording altogether too cautious. They might say, "Suppose
that the government had wanted to transform the traditional Fijian way of life, including
its provisions regarding land ownership. That still would not justify a coup, at least
so long as the government stayed within the law. That is what democracy is all
about-the right of the majority to make changes." This is the sort of challenge that
I imagine. But that response glides over some deep difficulties in constitutionalism and
in democratic theory.
With regard to constitutionalism, who decides whether the government is staying within
the law? One cannot assume American answers-which are themselves contested-to
these questions. Recall that Fiji was a former British colony with a parliamentary system.
With regard to democratic theory, there is the familiar question of the limits to what
the majority may do to the minority and what the minority is entitled to do if the majority
transgresses those limits. Suppose, foi example, that a democratically elected government,
representing a majority of voters, is embarking on a program of religious or racial
discrimination, even persecution, and that the minority-as is rarely the case-is in a
position to prevent this through a coup. Is it evident that a coup never would be justifiable
under those circumstances? I do not think so, although I would not say that these
circumstances necessarily legitimate a coup. These are complex questions, but I do not
propose to pursue them here because the problems that they raise simply do not apply
to the case of Fiji or to the behavior of its government.
170. Seegenerally ALASDAIRMACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSICE? WHICH RATIONALITy? (1988).
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Western criticism of the coup and of the treatment of the Fijian
Indians is a form of neocolonial imperialism.
171
I do not think that this challenge can be dismissed out of hand.
There is a real danger that in making moral judgments about
other societies, we will be led astray by misunderstandings or
misinterpretations of practices and institutions different from
our own. Anyone who has encountered the smug (and in impor-
tant respects unfounded) sense of moral superiority of even the
best of the nineteenth-century British liberals 172 ought to feel
some trepidation that his late twentieth-century judgments will
be seen by later generations as similarly tainted. On the other
hand, the first line of defense of every repressive security
apparatus is the claim "If you understood our situation-which
is very different from yours -you would understand why we have
to do these things." It would be a moral mistake to take such
claims about difference at face value.
So, we cannot and should not abandon the task of judging.
73
We cannot because such judging is implicit in as ordinary a daily
practice as reading the newspaper. Part of what makes a story
newsworthy is the assumption that it contains information that
engages our moral sensibilities. Think of recent reports about
Serbian-run death camps in Bosnia, 74 the Kurds' lack of food
and fuel,' 75 and the expulsion of Palestinians from Kuwait.
71
These stories are newsworthy in no small part because of the
171. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 262. This line of defense, supported by other island
states in the region, led the governments of Australia and New Zealand to retreat from
what had initially been quite critical responses to the coup. See id. at 261-66. In my
view, they have retreated too far, but I do not want to develop that argument here. In
this Article, I am primarily interested in the question of how we judge such issues from
a moral perspective as outside and unofficial observers. It may well be proper, at least
in some circumstances, for public officials to feel more constrained in their criticism of
other countries than private citizens. There is, of course, a certain irony in the native
Fijian invocation of the charge ofneocolonialism, given the resistance of the native Fijians
to decolonization, but this does not prove the charge untrue.
172. See, eg., JOHN STUART MI, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 81
(New York, Harper & Bros. 1862) ("As [a people] range[s] lower and lower in development,
[representative] government will be, generally speaking, less suitable to them .... );
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in THREE ESSAYS 5,16 (Oxford Univ. Press
1912) ("Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians .... ).
173. For an instructive discussion ofthe problem ofjudging as an outsider, see Ronald
Beiner, In Nationalist Wonderland, JERUSALEM REP., June 6, 1991, at 44.
174. See Chuck Sudetic, Road to Death in a Serbian Prison Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
29, 1992, at Al.
175. See Chris Hedges, Hungry and Cold, Kurds Turn to TV, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1992, at A12.
176. See YoussefM. Ibrahim, Palestinians in Kuwait Face Suspicion and Probable
Exile, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991, at Al.
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moral concerns that they evoke. We should not abandon the task
of judging because no defensible moral view can really refuse
all judgments about other societies. Consider again archetypal
cases like slavery in the United States, the Holocaust under the
Nazis, and apartheid in South Africa. Would a moral approach
that refused to make judgments about such cases be worthy of
serious consideration? When unarmed, peaceful marchers are
shot down simply for objecting to the current regime or its policy,
do we really need to inquire into the intricacies of local culture
before expressing moral condemnation?
No one can defend murder on the grounds of cultural difference,
and indeed no one tries to.'77 This means that there is a limit
to any plausible claim of moral or cultural relativism. What that
limit is, and where the appeal to cultural difference begins to
have some moral bite, is precisely the issue that I am exploring,
first by specifying here the limits to appeals to cultural difference
in moral arguments about Fiji and then by arguing below that
cultural difference does matter morally within those limits.
One answer to the challenge that we are imposing our own
moral views on others is to note that the view that we should
not do this is also one of our moral views. It is a characteristi-
cally liberal view really, one not shared by a number of other
cultural perspectives. In one sense, it is a truism that we start
from our own moral perspective. Where else could we start from?
The point is that our moral perspective contains both moral
principles about justice that we think apply to the actions of
people outside our own society and moral principles about
respecting the autonomy of others that we think limit our right
to judge how others live their lives, individually and collectively.
We normally suppose there to be some tension between these
different principles but not an actual contradiction. So, the
question is how to apply these different principles to the case
of Fiji.
To answer this question, we must unpack it a bit. First,
someone might argue that in raising the issue of equal citizenship
and the liberal democratic principles that underlie it, I am
introducing principles and ideals that are foreign to the traditions
and cultural values of Fiji, that have no roots in the Fijian
community. But this begs a crucial question about what the
177. Repressive regimes deny that they commit murder. They say that the protestors
had guns or threatened the security forces in some way or that the massacre never really
took place. Of course, if any of these claims were true, they would change our moral
judgment.
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community is and who belongs. For the challenges I have raised
from a liberal democratic perspective are the very ones that Fijian
Indians have been raising for decades in their demand for formal
political equality among all citizens and a common franchise that
does not recognize racial distinctions. 17  To claim that these
liberal democratic principles are morally irrelevant to Fiji because
they are not rooted in the culture of the Fijian community would
be to accept a definition of the Fijian community that excludes
or at least marginalizes the Indians who live there, to suggest
that we think that they really do not belong.
Second, let us consider the culture of the native Fijians. Does
it really entail a significantly different set of moral commitments
from the ones I have drawn upon in defending the claims of the
Fijian Indians? The key principle in my argument was the
principle of moral equality, a principle central to the Christian
tradition. Christianity has been an essential ingredient in Fijian
culture for over a century, 7 9 and the Fijians do not attempt to
defend their position by an appeal to pre-Christian values. Of
course, some Fijian Christians deny that their religious
commitments entail an obligation to respect the equal rights of
the Fijian Indians."s But there were lots of official Christian
apologists for slavery' and for apartheid in South Africa.8" The
point is that those who argued that slavery and apartheid were
incompatible with Christian principles had the better of the
argument. The critics of native Fijian domination have the better
of the argument, too, and for the same sorts of reasons. For the
most part, though, the Fijians have not attempted to mount a
reasoned defense of the coup and the subsequent policy of
subordinating the Fijian Indians, apart from the sorts of claims
that I have already criticized above."
It is tempting to describe the coup as simply a power grab, but
I do not think that such a description accurately would reflect
the support for the coup and especially for the post-coup reforms
among the native Fijian community. Many native Fijians do feel
that the coup was justified. In that sense, there is a deep
difference between their views and those of an outside observer
like me. But again, I do not think that this difference reflects
178. See GILLION, CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DOMINANCE, supra note 10, at 130-56.
179. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 8, 283-84.
180. Indeed, fundamentalism has a strong hold on the nativist movement. See HOWARD,
supra note 10, at 318-19.
181. See DAVID B. DAVIs, THE PEOBLI OF SLAVERY IN WEsIERN CULiuRE 165-222 (1966).
182. See LEONARD THOMPSON, THE POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY OF APARTHIFD 212-23 (1985).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
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a deep cultural difference about the nature ofjustice. To a large
extent, what the native Fijians put forward are simply claims
of identity and entitlement: "We are the Fijians; we were here
first." The same sort of sense of identity and entitlement is
common enough in other parts of the world, including Western
Europe and North America, and has often led to much worse
forms of repression of those defined as "other" than the Fijian
Indians have suffered. So we have no need or warrant to appeal
to special features of Fijian culture to account for these views,
and, by the same token, they are just as subject to the moral
criticisms (however ineffective these may be in changing behavior)
that have been applied to those seeking ethnic domination in
other countries.
V. JUSTICE, CULTURE, AND HIsToRY:
How DIFFERENCE MATTERS
Thus far, I have been arguing that cultural difference does not
make much difference, at least to our judgments about Fiji. But
now I want to turn to the aspects of the case where I think
culture and history do matter in the sense of legitimating
institutions and practices that might seem morally problematic
at first glance, and that still seem morally problematic to other
observers even after long reflection.
A. Moral Questions
There are two related sets of questions here. The first concerns
the practices and the institutions that perpetuate racial
separation in Fiji. What, if anything, differentiates these from
South Africa's apartheid, which also is based on a commitment
to separate development, or from former American practices of
racial segregation? Are these various forms of separation
compatible with shared membership in a political community?
The second set of questions concerns the justification for
entrenching the rights and privileges of one group and giving
it an effective veto over change in key areas. Doesn't this simply
perpetuate past inequalities in political power? Aren't these
special vetoes incompatible with fundamental democratic
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principles, especially since the rights that they protect are special
ones, not enjoyed even formally by all citizens? I will give a brief
version of my answers to these questions and then consider some
objections that will allow me to explore them more deeply.
B. The Moral Justification of Cultural Preservation:
An Overview
Did the separate institutions that Fiji developed violate this
principle of equal citizenship to which the Fijian Indians were
and are entitled? I think not. Fiji's separate institutions were
not like those of apartheid or racial segregation because they did
not grow out of and perpetuate racial domination. On the
contrary, most of these institutions were designed to protect
native Fijians against domination, especially by the European
settlers. In a more positive sense, they were intended to preserve
traditional values and the Fijian way of life. But this was not
dependent upon the subordination of any other group. Having
a separate Fijian administration, for example, did not stigmatize
the Indians and Europeans who were excluded from its
jurisdiction or deprive them of any powers they ought to have
possessed. By contrast, the refusal to grant Indians the franchise
at a time when the Europeans had it clearly was a symbol and
a contributor to the subordinate position of the Indians vis-a-vis
the Europeans.
The separate Fijian institutions were different. Indeed, it
seems likely that these institutions contributed to the economic
subordination of native Fijians. Still, the Fijians wanted the
insulation that the institutions offered, and the reduced economic
opportunities may well have been a price worth paying for the
possibility of prolonging the traditional way of life.
Today, that way of life no longer seems viable because of
population growth and the desire for economic development.
There are too many people and not enough land for a way of life
based upon subsistence agriculture. An agriculture that aims
at producing a substantial surplus is not as congruent with the
values and practices of the traditional Fijian way of life.
Moreover, many Fijians no longer are willing to live in the
traditional ways. Even the Fijian leadership, in the past the
group that has most emphasized the importance of maintaining
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the traditional way of life, now expresses great concern about
the relative position of native Fijians in the general economic
competition.' As Fijians come to want the same things that
other members of society do, the case for separate institutions
declines.
There are two major qualifications to the picture that I have
been drawing of benign but outmoded separate institutions. First,
the ownership of land-there is no question that the fact that
the native Fijians collectively own eighty-two percent of the
land"s has been a source of great power for them in relation to
other groups. This is especially true in relation to the Fijian
Indians, whose inability to buy land and whose insecurity about
the length and renewals of leases have been a source of great
unhappiness in their community.'8 Nevertheless, I think that
the practices of prohibiting the sale of Fijian land and exercising
central control over its administration have been and still are
justified.
There are three key points to the defense of the policy on land
ownership. First, prior to this prohibition, Fijians were selling
land, mainly to Europeans, and there is every reason to believe
on the basis of the experience of other colonies that without this
arrangement Fijians would have given up ownership of their land
without receiving any substantial long-term benefits in return
and without foreseeing the consequences for their collective way
of life. So, this arrangement did protect a vital Fijian interest.
Second, Fijian dominance in this area is balanced by the
dominance Indians have achieved in other areas of economic life.
If native Fijians owned most of the businesses and occupied most
of the key professional and white-collar positions as well, then
it would be easier to make the case that this form of "cultural
preservation" was merely a means of perpetuating unjust
privilege. Third, despite the erosion of the traditional culture,
it appears that the land is still central to the native Fijian self-
understanding. The attachment to the land is not merely
instrumental; it is constitutive of native Fijian identity. Like
the previous condition, this one could change. If both conditions
changed, the justification of this arrangement would be greatly
184. LASAQA, supra note 10, at 103.
185. See SCARR, PoLmics OF ILLUSION, supra note 10, at 10; Lal, supra note 10, at 81.
186. See MAYER, supra note 10, at 79-82; All, supra note 148, at 23.
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reduced. None of this is meant to suggest that the administration
of the land and the conditions imposed on tenants could not be
improved.
The second qualification to the benign picture of separate
institutions concerns the racial classification of political seats.
Here my judgment coincides with that of the Street Commis-
sion. "' Given the depth of racial divisions in Fiji, it was essential
to provide some guarantee of representation to all three ethnic
communities. To adopt a system that pretended to be racially
blind in the Fijian context would have been to ignore the
underlying social realities in a way that would not have improved
them. Perhaps of equal importance, in the context of Fijian
political history such an apparently neutral reform inevitably
would have been perceived as a partisan triumph. But if Fiji
is to have any sort of decent future, these deep racial divisions
ultimately must be overcome. In this respect, the liberal
democratic ideal of a common franchise does establish the
ultimate goal toward which reforms should aim.
It is a commonplace critique of liberalism to note that formal
equality may mask substantive and unjust inequality. This case
illustrates a different, more unusual point. Formal inequalities
may actually contribute to the goal of treating people as moral
equals or giving their interests equal moral weight.
18
Let me turn finally in this overview to the question of the
constitutional entrenchment of Fijian rights and their protection
through the veto power given the Council of Chiefs in the Senate.
The justification for this sort of special arrangement must be that
the interests being protected are vital and yet vulnerable without
these special protections. I already have argued that the interests
were vital. As to their vulnerability, I suspect that the fates of
indigenous peoples elsewhere, and even nearby, provided
sufficient reason for Fijians to be concerned. As with the separate
187. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
188. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 199-200. But Kymlicka believes that it is possible
to make this argument without making substantive judgments about the good, because,
on his account of liberalism, such judgments must be left to individuals to make for
themselves and the state must be neutral between competing conceptions. See id. I
think that the case of Fiji will illustrate why that sort of neutrality is impossible. My
own defense of cultural preservation in Fiji rests on my judgment about the goodness
of the way of life that was being preserved, at least as against the historical alternatives
that were available to native Fijians. This is not to say that it is appropriate for me
to substitute my judgment about how Fijians are to live their lives for their own. One
of the issues here is the relation between the substantive moral judgments of an observer
and the substantive moral choices of agents. I will explore some facets ofthis issue below.
See infra part VII.B.
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institutions discussed above, the goal of these arrangements
seems to be the protection of the native Fijians rather than
domination by the native Fijians of the Fijian Indians. The
Senate did not initiate legislation, and the veto power only
affected the areas most relevant to the protection of native Fijian
culture. l 9 In short, here is an institutional arrangement
specifically designed for the preservation of culture -potentially
a minority culture, depending on demographic developments-that
seems morally justifiable to me.
C. Objections
There are many objections that could be raised to the line of
argument that I am taking, and most of them have been in what
I regard as by far the best scholarly work on the politics of Fiji:
Stephanie Lawson's The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji.
Lawson's work is particularly valuable from my perspective
because she is so clearly critical of most of the efforts to preserve
Fijian culture that no one could reasonably accuse her of
distorting her interpretation to favor preservation. Yet because
she is so scrupulously fair-minded in her presentation, much of
the evidence that she provides supports the case for cultural
preservation in ways that she herself does not acknowledge or
perhaps even recognize.
Lawson directs particular critical attention to what she calls
the myth of Fijian cultural homogeneity. Much of what is
called traditional Fijian culture, Lawson argues, is really a
product of the colonial regime. 9 ° It created the Council of
Chiefs and the separate Fijian administration and, in doing
so, greatly strengthened the power of some hierarchical
elements in Fijian society at the expense of other, less
hierarchical elements. Diversity and dissent among native
Fijians were repressed. Before the colonial regime, land-was
neither inalienable nor held by the communal units to which
the colonial government assigned it. To the extent that native
Fijians today think of themselves as sharing a common culture
which entails respect for chiefly authority, this is the result
of years of hegemony by chiefs and their representatives who
189. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 188.
190. See id. at 93-104.
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have introduced a powerful system of socialization to convey
a limited and inaccurate picture of Fijian culture.
According to Lawson, the costs of perpetuating this myth have
been high. The separate institutions and formal racial divisions
in colonial and independent Fiji that were defended in the name
of the myth exacerbated racial divisions in Fiji and led to the
emergence of a party system based on race. This in turn
undermined the legitimacy of democratic politics, especially the
idea of a democratic opposition that might succeed legitimately
to power through elections, and ultimately led to the coup.' 91
Implicit, and sometimes explicit, in Lawson's book is a challenge
to the very ideal of cultural preservation, at least if Fiji is to be
taken as a model. A major part of the challenge focuses on the
issue of authenticity and suggests the impossibility of authentic
preservation of a culture. Doesn't the attempt to preserve a
collective cultural identity inevitably falsify that identity by
freezing it in some respects and transforming it in others, and
in neither case responding to the internal imperatives of the
culture itself? Who speaks for the collective? Doesn't external
support for a cultural leadership show that there is something
problematic about its claim to internal legitimacy? Shouldn't
individuals be free to choose whether to accept, modify, or reject
their inherited cultural identity, and isn't that freedom restricted
when steps are taken to preserve a culture? These are the ques-
tions raised implicitly and explicitly by Lawson's book.
I think that one can give different answers to these questions
from the ones provided by Lawson. I accept many of her
descriptive claims about the development of Fijian culture, but
I do not think that undermines its authenticity or legitimacy in
the way that she suggests. To see why, we will have to look at
some specific issues in more detail.
D. Permissibility and Contingency in Morality
As the analysis proceeds, it will be helpful to keep two
distinctions in mind. The first is the distinction between what
is morally permissible and what is morally required. Until now,
I have been focusing largely on the latter sort of argument,
claiming that it was morally required to treat the Fijian Indians
191. Id. at 1-11, 277-80.
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as equal citizens and morally wrong to stage the coup. But I do
not want to make so strong a moral claim about the efforts to
preserve Fijian culture before the coup. Rather, I want to argue
that most of the measures taken were morally permissible -that
is, one possible set of steps it was legitimate to take even though
other, quite different ones might also not have been wrong. In
other words, these efforts at preservation were one morally
permissible way to go, given the available options, even though
there may have been other options that were also morally
permissible and that might even be regarded as superior in some
respects.
The second distinction is that between the evaluation of what
has happened and the evaluation of what preceded. We should
not assume that what did happen, had to happen. I have already
made clear my condemnation of the coup and the subsequent
policies of domination. It does not follow that the policies of
cultural preservation that preceded it were morally blameworthy.
The coup may not have been inevitable, and even if the policies
of preservation contributed to its likelihood, as Lawson argues,'92
it is possible that alternative policies would have been likely to
lead to even worse consequences. In forming our moral judgments
about what courses of action are morally permissible or
blameworthy, we have to take into account the role of contingency
and uncertainty in human affairs.
VI. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HISTORY, CULTURE,
AND MORALITY: THE ISSUE OF LAND
A. Objections to Colonial Land Policy
Let me begin with the issue of land rights. Lawson observes
that Gordon, the first colonial governor, set up a uniform system
of inalienable land ownership with the rights held in a particular
communal unit. This was, she says, very much at odds with
traditional practice. 93 First, land had not been inalienable prior
to the colonial regime. More importantly, this communal unit
had not been a landholding unit for most Fijians and had played
192. Id. at 6.
193. Id. at 73.
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a relatively minor role in most Fijian communities prior to this
colonial practice. Now it has now come to be seen by most Fijians
as the traditional landholding unit, but the rigidities imposed
by this arrangement have led to significant inequalities in
ownership between different units because of variation in fertility
and mortality among units. '9 Those inequalities could have been
addressed under the more fluid, precolonial arrangements, but
there is no easy solution today. 1
95
Suppose that everything Lawson says about the transformation
of traditional practices is true or largely so. What should we
conclude? Was it a good policy or at least a permissible one?
One important question is what the alternative was and how good
or bad that would have been.
The most likely alternative would have been a land policy
designed to grant individual title to native Fijians and, more
generally, to open up the land for fuller commercial exploitation.
Would that have been desirable? Something like it was in fact
tried. Lawson tells us that a later governor, Everard im Thurn,
worried about the subordination of ordinary Fijians to their chiefs.
He wanted to promote individualism among the Fijians, including
a sense of economic ambition. To this end and as a way of
reducing the chiefs' control, he wanted to have English taught
in the village schools, not just to the children of the chiefs."
But his most dramatic innovation was a policy designed to reverse
the previous assumption that "all non-alienated lands, occupied
or otherwise, had Fijian 'owners'."197 With the enthusiastic
support of the European settlers, he tried to open up
"underutilized" land for commercial purposes. Between 1905 and
1908, 105,000 acres were sold and 170,000 put under long-term
lease, a significant portion of the best agricultural land in Fiji.
Gordon, the first governor, was then in the House of Lords; when
he learned of this policy, he used his influence to put an end to
it, and it was not subsequently renewed. 98
Was Gordon's intervention and the failure of this new land
policy to be regretted? Here is Lawson's own assessment: "It
194. Id. at 75.
195. Id. at 73-78.
196. Id. at 86-87. Lawson is not entirely clear about what became of this proposal,
but it seems to have been dropped because of resistance from the chiefs and the mis-
sionaries who controlled most of the schools. The governor's persistence with his land
policy may suggest where his true priorities lay.
197. Id. at 89.
198. Id. at 88-90.
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was, of course, fortunate at that time that the European
population was prevented from encroaching too far upon the
land-whether the land was occupied or not. In other ways,
however, the consequences have not been so fortunate . .9
This seems a striking statement given Lawson's general position
on preservation. What lies behind her ambivalence? In what
ways was it fortunate and in what ways unfortunate?
With regard to the native Fijians, Lawson seems to think the
prohibition on the sale of land was unfortunate because it reduced
incentives for individual economic activity and because it was
an integral part of Gordon's overall strategy of cultural
preservation, which she sees as a conservative orthodoxy.2" But
listen to what she acknowledges to be the advantage of the policy
for the Fijians: it "discouraged an influx of white immigration
which might have been expected had the land been thrown open
for settlement. Unlike the neighbouring colonies of Australia
and New Zealand, then, the indigenous population could not be
pushed further and further off their lands to make way for white
expansion."'
If these are the advantages and disadvantages, the preferable
course for Fijians seems clear. Australia and New Zealand were
the models that the settlers wanted to emulate and that Gordon
wanted to avoid. Whatever the economic and social costs to
Fijians of Gordon's plan, they pale beside the costs of the
alternative suffered by the indigenous peoples in Australia and
New Zealand.2 °2
B. Context and Contingency in the
Evaluation of the Past
Lawson has articulated precisely the sort of considerations that
I think ought to be taken into account in our moral judgments:
plausible historical possibilities and factors that the actors facing
a situation could reasonably be expected to consider. We cannot
just compare the path Fiji actually took with some hypothetically
benign course in which the Fijians harmoniously developed
racially integrated economic and political institutions, effectively
199. Id. at 90.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 77.
202. See supra note 142.
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transforming their cultural traditions in ways that enabled them
to compete successfully as individuals with other groups, if that
imagined course was not in any sense a real historical possibility.
Of the two paths which were clearly open, Gordon's and the more
liberal individualistic one pushed by his successor, I see no
grounds even on Lawson's own account for preferring the latter,
if one is concerned about the welfare of the Fijians in the short
or long run. If there was some third and superior alternative,
we need some specification of what it might have been and how
it might have worked.
I must acknowledge that there is a danger in the emphasis that
I am placing on the importance of historical context, namely, that
one can accept too readily constraints which, however real, should
themselves be subject to criticism. It is a deep problem for
political theory as to how one is to incorporate the constraints
of history without losing one's critical and theoretical perspective.
This dilemma is brought home all the more forcefully when
we turn our attention to the group which has thus far remained
offstage in this part of the discussion: the Fijian Indians. As
Lawson notes, one major consequence of the policy on the
inalienability of Fijian land is that the Indian population and
their descendants were doomed by it to become and remain "a
landless majority in their adopted country."2°" If land is crucial
to the well-being of the native Fijians, it is also crucial to the
well-being of the Fijian Indians. Their insecurities about land
are one of their central, long-standing complaints.20 4 Did and
does the rule against alienation adequately respect their moral
claims?
Certainly the costs of this policy for the Fijian Indians should
count against it. Are the costs great enough to judge it on balance
to have been or to be morally wrong? Again, thinking about this
in historical context is perplexing. Should we ask whether the
policy should have been adopted in the actual historical context,
assuming that the system of indentured labor and white
domination were to be in place? That seems odd. Surely both
of those features of the colonial system were much more deeply
problematic from a moral perspective than the inalienability of
land. Why would we focus exclusively on the latter?
We could ask instead whether such a policy would have been
justified if the rest of the colonial policy had been just, assuming
203. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 77.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
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that is not an oxymoron. But then we drift so far from reality
that we begin to lose the bearings that we need to make an
intelligent judgment about the question. Do we assume away
white domination and the indenture system? How about the
colonial government? How about the incursions of the European
settlers that made becoming a colony seem like an attractive
option to some of the Fijian leaders? Remember that the most
powerful argument in favor of the policy is the role that it played
in preserving the native Fijians from the fate suffered by
indigenous peoples in Australia and New Zealand. Do we want
to say that that fate was unfortunate butjust? I doubt it. If not,
when we remove injustice hypothetically from the situation, we
remove much of the rationale for the policy. It was, after all,
a defensive policy. The Fijians did not practice strict inalien-
ability before the arrival of the Europeans, but alienability within
the internal, noncapitalist Fijian context was not such a threat
to the well-being of most Fijians.
Perhaps we should focus exclusively on the issue of land policy
because altering it was a realistic possibility, as is evidenced by
the actual, if temporary, change in the early 1900s, while the
other morally problematic arrangements-such as white
domination and indenture-were inevitable under the circum-
stances. But inevitable in what sense? What this really means
is that the Europeans were so firmly in power and had such
ability to defend their vital interests that no fundamental
challenge to them could succeed. (Indeed, it is remarkable what
Gordon was able to do to limit their claims.) But here we confront
again the question of what should be taken as a given for
purposes of moral theory and what should be subjected to critical
analysis.
C. Cultural Change, Moral Legitimacy,
and Contemporary Land Policy
It is tempting to try to avoid these conundrums by refusing
to judge the past and skipping to the present. Some might
say, "We cannot change history; we can only be just in our
own time." From this perspective, we should ask only whether
it is just now for the Fijians to hold their land inalienably in
collective units. I will try to address that question, though
I am afraid that the issues raised above about appropriate,
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realistic constraints will not go away, and this is not only
because the present will soon be the past.
The basic picture seems to be this: a somewhat fluid set of
arrangements with regard to land in precolonial Fiji became much
more rigid and fixed with the assignment of inalienable rights
to collective units. This helped to protect the native Fijians from
the disasters suffered by indigenous groups in neighboring
colonies, but it also had the effect of changing Fijian culture,
making land and these collective units more central than before.
Now the threat of a European takeover of the land is greatly
reduced, but the Fijians feel threatened by the Indians' desire
for land. Ordinary native Fijians seem to feel a powerful
attachment to the land and to have a lot at stake in their sense
that they own the land, even when they do not live on it or work
it themselves. Lawson herself indirectly attests to the power of
this attachment when she notes critically that Fijian politicians
have exaggerated the threat to Fijian ownership of the land that
an Indian- dominated government would pose as a way of stirring
up support for themselves and opposition to Fijian Indians." 5
Her criticism of the tactic is entirely appropriate, but it is
essential to see that the tactic can work only if native Fijians
care about the land, at least-or perhaps especially-as a
symbolic and cultural issue. In other words, the native Fijians
themselves seem to regard continued Fijian ownership of the land
as a vital interest.
We do not have to accept that perception at face value. One
could argue, as Lawson does, that some of the features of Fijian
culture are the product of a manipulative system of socializa-
tion.206 But I want to defer examination of that criticism to the
discussion of chiefly authority. Instead, I want to focus here on
the question of whether cultural change undermines the moral
legitimacy of claims made in the name of culture.
I have noted how Fijian attitudes toward land were altered
by the colonial policies designed to protect them. Is that a reason
for discounting the present attachment? I do not see why. The
Fijian attachment to the land clearly has deep, precolonial roots.
Similarly, the communal units that own the land are not simply
the creation of the colonial regime, even if they generally did not
have ownership rights over the land before Gordon's policy.
205. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 2-5.
206. See id. at 2.
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Even if both the attachment to the land and the land-owning
unit had been entirely created by the colonial regime, to take
an extreme hypothesis, it is not clear why that would discredit
them if people were deeply attached to them over one hundred
years later. Remember, I am setting to one side the issue of
manipulation of the culture for the sake of internal domination.
By hypothesis, we are dealing with a case where the cultural
commitments in question are neutral or benign in their effect
on those who hold them, but where they derive, at least in part,
from some source exogenous to the culture.
As I see it, all cultures are subject to exogenous influences.
That does not, however, prove that there are no legitimate
cultural commitments or attachments. What makes something
a legitimate part of people's culture, regardless of its origins, is
the fact that they have internalized it, made it their own,
integrated it with other aspects of their culture. Of course, one
can argue about whether that has actually occurred in a given
case, but, as I have tried to suggest, the depth of the Fijian
attachment to the land today does not seem to be in dispute.
What people regard as important is, in some respects at least,
contingent and variable. But if they see something as important,
we should take it seriously if we wish to take them seriously.
That does not settle the question of what is to be done in cases
of conflicting claims. It does mean, however, that external
observers should not pass judgment on the authenticity, and
hence moral legitimacy, of some cultural commitment on the basis
of its origins. °7
So, native Fijians today are entitled to treat their land as a
vital interest because of the role that it plays in their culture.
But what about Fijian Indians? They have vital interests at stake
here too. For the Fijian Indians, as far as I can tell, the concern
with regard to the land is an economic interest rather than a
cultural one. I do not mean to suggest that this economic interest
is less vital. It may be more vital in some contexts. But it does
suggest that some compromise might be possible that would
respect the security interests of Fijian Indian farmers without
challenging the cultural claims of native Fijians to ownership.
It is a familiar legal point that ownership is a bundle of rights
and that these rights can be organized differently for different
207. 1 emphasize external observers because claims about origins can sometimes play
a role in internal debates within cultures about questions of authenticity.
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purposes. °" Under these circumstances, it should be possible
to find some arrangement that meets the concerns of both Fijian
Indians and native Fijians. Under other circumstances, that
might not be the case.2°
D. Is Cultural Preservation Always Paternalistic?
Inalienability and Interests
Let me turn to one final possible objection to perpetuating
inalienable land rights, namely, that it is a form of paternalism.
The argument goes something like the following. If individual
Fijians or Fijian communal units do not want to sell their land,
they do not have to do so. No one will force them to sell. If they
do want to do so, and the chiefs want the land to be inalienable
in order to prevent it, the chiefs are acting paternalistically.21 °
Now the first point to note in response is that even Lawson
does not seem to think this sort of argument would have been
an adequate reason for permitting Fijians to sell land at the
beginning of the colonial period. The implication of the passages
that I cited earlier seems to be that the widespread alienation
of Fijian land then, however voluntary, would have been a
disaster for the Fijian people as it was for indigenous peoples
elsewhere.21' One could perhaps argue that native Fijians today
do not need as much protection against potential Fijian Indian
domination as their ancestors needed against European
domination. I think that there is something to that claim, but
we cannot overlook the much greater economic success of the
Fijian Indians212 and therefore the possibility that the ownership
of land would become concentrated in their hands if Fijian land
208. See, eg., Hodelv. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,716 (1987); LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY
RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 18 (1977); Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity,
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLVY 2, 3 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property,
in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69,69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
209. It is not unknown for two different groups to have powerful cultural attachments
to the same land. In such cases, a just solution is harder, perhaps even impossible, to
achieve. Nevertheless, we do not advance the cause of justice by denying that cultural
concerns matter. That they do matter is sometimes the only thing that the conflicting
groups can agree upon and must be the starting point for reflection.
210. At one point, Lawson quotes a passage from another author who develops this
argument at length. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 191 (quoting W.F. Newton, Fijians,
Indians, and Independence, 42 AUSTRALIAN Q. 33, 38 (1970)).
211. See supra part VI.A.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 60-68.
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were not inalienable. That outcome is a problem only if one
accepts the argument advanced earlier that ownership of the land
is central to Fijian culture and that a significant erosion of that
culture would be bad for native Fijians. But that just throws
the paternalism argument back one step further. If particular
Fijians want to act in ways that undermine their own culture,
why shouldn't they be free to do so? Isn't the attempt to preserve
a culture through a practice like making land inalienable an
unjustified form of paternalism?
In fact, it is neither paternalistic nor unjustified. As Russell
Hardin has argued, making certain rights inalienable or
restricting the range of actions of the members of a group to
which one belongs is a perfectly intelligible way of protecting one's
interests in a context in which collective action problems or
externalities create incentives for individuals to act in ways
contrary to their more important collective interests.213 This is
not necessarily a form of paternalism, if by paternalism one
means requiring people to conform to policies or rules in ways
that go against their own best judgment of their interests, but
which others believe will be in their interest. When constraints
instead are self-imposed as a way of avoiding collective-action
problems, it is misleading to call them paternalistic.
From this perspective, the policy on inalienable collective
ownership of land in Fiji is far less paternalistic today than it
was when it was introduced. Then, it was primarily the result
of a judgment by the colonial government about what would be
good for the Fijians, not something that they had chosen for
themselves. Today, by contrast, the policy has the strong and
explicit support of a substantial majority of native Fijians.214
Keeping land inalienable is not a form of paternalism, but rather
a way of respecting the demands of most Fijians. Of course, this
still leaves open the question of whether it is legitimate to require
the minority of Fijians who do not share this view to conform
to it, but that is a familiar problem in any context of democratic
decision making, where choices must be made about collective
goods in the absence of a consensus.
215
213. See RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON 92-96 (1988).
214. This conclusion seems to me the obvious implication of Lawson's discussion of
the way the issue plays politically, although she herself does not draw this inference.
See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 2-5.
215. It is only libertarians who suppose that the solution to such problems is to deny
that they exist by letting individuals decide for themselves.
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In sum, the constitutional entrenchment of inalienable land
rights is morally permissible because it offers one way to protect
interests that most Fijians regard as vital and that would be
vulnerable in the absence of this institutional arrangement
because of collective-action problems. Is this arrangement
morally required? I would not go so far as to answer this
affirmatively in today's world because the Fijians gradually are
integrating themselves into the market economy. As they do so,
the moral urgency of maintaining the distinctive Fijian culture
will diminish. There may well come a time when the mainte-
nance of inalienable land rights would no longer be primarily
a way of protecting a vital aspect of Fijian culture, but rather
just a way of achieving economic advantage in relation to the
Fijian Indians. If that should occur, the policy would no longer
be morally defensible. When such a point is reached is, of course,
subject to interpretation and debate like every other substantive
moral judgment that one can make about this case or any other.
VII. AuTHENTICITY, INTERESTS, AND DEMOCRACY:
THREE CHALLENGES TO THE MORAL LEGITIMACY
OF CHIEFLY AUTHORITY
Let me turn now to the question of chiefly authority. The chiefs
and their supporters have claimed that deference to chiefly
authority has long been a central part of traditional Fijian
culture. This was, at least ostensibly, an important part of the
original justification for constructing a separate administration
and giving the chiefs a key role in running it, that is, that this
way of organizing colonial political and legal institutions was
the most congruent with indigenous Fijian culture. Lawson
objects that this account is based on a distortion of Fijian culture,
that it serves the interests of the Fijian chiefs at the expense of
the Fijian people, and that it undermines desirable democratic
institutions and practices in Fiji as a whole.216 I will explore each
of these objections in turn.
216. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 93-117.
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A. Authenticity and Cultural Change
First, consider what I will call the issue of authenticity. I have
touched on aspects of this issue already in my discussion of the
place of land in Fijian culture, and now I will explore it further.
In general terms, the problems posed by the issue of authenticity
might be put as follows. Some people object to any effort at
cultural preservation on the grounds that every culture is
indeterminate and contested, and that the idea of preserving a
culture inevitably privileges one particular understanding of the
culture over others and rigidifies the culture in an artificial
way. 217 That objection can be raised even when the efforts at
preservation are being carried out by institutions like museums
218
and, even if (as often is not the case) the museum officials are
members of the community whose culture the museum is trying
to preserve. The objection takes on added force when political
authority is involved. Is it morally legitimate for those with
political power to promote their interpretation of a "shared"
culture and to determine what measures shall be taken to
preserve it? What, besides force, makes their view of the culture
authoritative?
219
217. See Waldron, supra note 4, at 761-65.
218. See Welsh, supra note 3, at 841-46.
219. This problem is complicated further when it is a question of a minority culture,
so that those from the minority culture who have political power within their own group
are nevertheless subject, at least potentially, to political constraints from the majority
outside the group. What ifa minority within the minority appeals to this overall majority
in the name of the minority's own culture which the dissidents may say those in power
are not respecting? For example, native women in Canada have argued that the Canadian
government should not permit them to be excluded from membership in their bands and
expelled from their reservations for marrying nonnatives when the same rules do not
apply to native men who marry nonnative women. When those sympathetic to native
self-government argue that the native women should not use Western concepts of equality
between the sexes to challenge traditional native practices, the women sometimes reply
that the male chiefs are not following traditional native culture, which varied considerably
from one tribe to another and often permitted women who married nonnatives to remain
with their tribe. They point out that the exclusionary rule, at least in its universal form,
was imposed by an earlier Canadian government in the name of Western patriarchal
values that many native groups did not share, but which some male chiefs have come
to accept because it suits their interests to do so. See KATHLEEN JAMIESON, INDIAN WOMEN
AND THE LAW IN CANADA: CITIZENS MINUS 79-88 (1978); Kathleen Gallivan, Two Kinds
of Indians: Native Women and Their Claims to Indian Identity 25 (May 1988)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
So far as I can tell, however, this particular sort of complication about who speaks in
the authentic voice of the tradition has not yet arisen among the Fijians themselves,
though variants of it perhaps are implicit in some of the challenges to the chiefs.
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However problematic political efforts at cultural preservation
may seem in a liberal democratic society-with its institutional
mechanisms for deliberation, choice, and dissent by the
citizenry-they are likely to seem even more problematic in
societies where authority is said to rest on tradition rather than
choice. How do we know that what is put forward as a "shared
culture" is not merely a self-serving ideology designed to preserve
existing patterns of privilege and power? How do we know
whether those without power really accept and share this culture?
If they are silent, is it because they agree or because they have
no voice? If the traditional culture is to be preserved in the name
of the people who share it, don't we have to know what they
think, how they see their own culture, and whom they regard
as legitimate spokespersons? 220 And even if ordinary people do
accept the legitimacy of"traditional" authorities, how do we know
that their acceptance is not just the product of a manipulative
system of socialization?
221
1. Colonial Promotion of Chiefly Rule -All of these questions
are relevant to the issue of chiefly authority in Fiji. Lawson
points out that before Fiji became a colony, there was considerable
regional variation in patterns of authority and social organization.
While chiefs played some significant social role in all parts of
precolonial Fiji, it was only in the eastern region of the main
island that a strongly hierarchical pattern of chiefly rule
predominated.222 The colonial regime, with the cooperation of
the eastern Fijian chiefs, defined this strongly hierarchical
pattern as the traditional system of Fijian rule, using it as the
220. Perhaps someone will object that such a question entails the (moral) imposition
of our own liberal democratic values on other cultures. But then the objector must explain
why we ought to respect other cultures at all. As I argued above, it is not possible in
practice to sustain a radically relativistic view of the morality of other cultures, that is,
a view that sets no limits on what counts as morally legitimate social arrangements and
cultural values. See supra part IV.
221. Now that Marxism is in such disrepute, terms like "false consciousness" are
shunned. There are indeed good reasons to be wary of any claim that someone else's
self-understanding is false. One risks running roughshod over any view of the world
that does not comport with one's own. On the other hand, it would require a willful
blindness to deny that manipulative socialization has played an important role in
maintaining patterns of unjust domination with regard to race, class, and gender, both
in our own society and in others. The challenge, therefore, is to find an approach which
provides a critical perspective on societies, including our own, and which at the same
time is open to the possibility of genuine and legitimate differences among people's values
and commitments. In one sense, this particular problem simply recapitulates the basic
issue that this entire Article is addressing.
222. HOWARD, supra note 10, at 17.
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key structural element for purposes of colonial administration.2
Different patterns were forcibly suppressed, and all of Fiji was
required to conform to this model. Hierarchical relationships
were formalized to meet the requirements of administration, and
in some cases entirely new hierarchical institutions, most notably
the Council of Chiefs, were created by the colonial regime.2 4
According to Lawson, this arrangement might be attributed as
much or more to the familiar colonial strategy of indirect rule
as to any real desire to respect traditional patterns of Fijian
authority.225 At the very least, the hierarchical dimensions of
Fijian culture were reinforced dramatically by the institutions
of colonial administration. So, according to Lawson, chiefly
authority in its current form is not a deeply rooted, long-standing
element of a common Fijian culture, as its defenders would have
it, but rather, in important respects, a relatively recent addition
created largely to serve the needs of the colonial regime.
26
If chiefly rule is as tainted by its colonial connections as Lawson
argues, why do the Fijian people put such store in their chiefs
today? Lawson's answer to this question seems ambiguous. At
times, she emphasizes the chiefs' attachment to chiefly hierar-
chy.227 At other points, she seems to be saying that ordinary
Fijians do accept chiefly hierarchy as central to the Fijian way
of life, but only because the chiefs have established and
maintained their position through fear, superstition, and
propaganda. 2' Among other techniques, Lawson says, the chiefs
have insisted that they alone are authoritative interpreters of
Fijian tradition, and then they use that interpretive authority
both to bolster their claims to exercise legitimate social authority
and to influence the understanding of particular social and
political issues.
Overall, then, Lawson argues that the chiefly hierarchy rests
its claim to legitimacy on appeals to a traditional Fijian culture
which it misrepresents. Because existing patterns of chiefly rule
have deeper roots in colonialism than in precolonial Fijian culture,
223. See id. at 25.
224. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 63-69.
225. Id. at 60-64.
226. Id. at 97.
227. Id. at 100-07.
228. Id. at 100-04. Lawson explicitly uses the phrase "a century of propaganda" to
account for why ordinary Fijians accept the current patterns of sociopolitical organization,
including landholding, as long-standing and traditional for all Fijians, despite the evidence
of historians to the contrary. Id. at 96.
229. Id. at 105.
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chiefly hierarchy in its present form is not an authentic
expression of indigenous Fijian culture.Y She explicitly considers
and rejects an argument to the effect that what matters is the
attachment of past and contemporary Fijians to their forms of
social organization, including chiefly authority, rather than
questions of historical origins. Lawson objects that such a
position implies that "the legitimacy of the 'tradition' embodied
in the uniform structure [of contemporary Fijian social organiza-
tion] is not derived from any consideration of its origins, but from
the purpose it has come to serve." 31
2. How Much Continuity Is Enough? Who Decides?-
Lawson's objection is well worth considering. An appeal to
tradition is a claim about continuity. If there is no continuity,
doesn't the appeal fail? To put it another way, attachment and
interest are not the same as authenticity. The fact that people
are attached to some institution or benefit from some practice
tells us nothing about their relation to past institutions and
practices. But isn't the relation to the past what matters if the
institution or practice is defended on the grounds of "tradition"?
Suppose that we answer the last question affirmatively. What
sort of relation with the past, how much continuity, is necessary
for something to count as "traditional"? To put it another way,
under what circumstances does it make sense to talk of
"preserving" some aspect of a culture? It makes no sense to insist
that any element of change in an institution or practice renders
it nontraditional. All cultures evolve and change. It is the sense
of continuity within change that the idea of tradition evokes.
Consider, as an analogy, the idea of being faithful to a constitu-
tion. As the debates over constitutional interpretation show,
there are no simple answers to the question of what counts as
continuity in constitutional law.23
Let us move from the abstract to the concrete. Was there
enough continuity between precolonial Fijian culture and the
institutions and practices created by the colonial regime tojustify
230. Lawson never uses the word "authentic" but this concern is implicit in the logic
of her critique. See id. at 93-94.
231. Id. at 99. Lawson's argument comes in the context of a critique of Macnaught.
See id. In my view, this is in part an unfair criticism. Pursuit of that issue, however,
would take me too far from my main concerns.
232. Seegenerally SANFORDLEVINSON, CONSTITuTIONALFAITH(1988). Ofcourse, one
solution is to deny the possibility of continuity altogether, but, like all forms of radical
skepticism, this is a difficult position to maintain. A more defensible position, which
is compatible with (though not required by) what I have said in the text, is to insist that
any particular claim to continuity is contestable.
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a claim that the new order was traditional in some meaningful
sense, that it was a way of preserving Fijian culture? Lawson
herself seems to concede as much, saying, "The system did much
to preserve the indigenous culture and way of life, even though
some aspects of these were of dubious value."' What is perhaps
even more important is that the native Fijians themselves treated
the continuity as significant.
If the question of authenticity is essentially a question about
how to appraise a relationship with the past that includes
elements of both continuity and discontinuity, it would seem
reasonable to let the people whose culture and history are in
question be the judges of whether contemporary institutions and
practices should be regarded as authentically traditional. " This
is not the same as saying that whatever institutions and practices
they accept are authentic. Rather, it is to say that whatever
institutions and practices they accept as traditional are authentic.
For example, most native Fijians seem to accept legislatures and
elections as legitimate social institutions in the sense that no
significant segment of the native Fijian population suggests that
it would be appropriate today to choose political rulers purely
on the basis of heredity or to rule by fiat. But no one claims that
these institutions are traditional. Of course, people in a given
culture may disagree among themselves about what is authentic.
But, in the case of the Fijian people, there seems to be surpris-
ingly little disagreement on such key issues as whether a deep
attachment to the land and respect for chiefly authority are
authentic elements of Fijian culture and whether the contem-
porary institutional incarnations of these values are legitimate.~
One scholar, who explicitly acknowledges the ways in which
the arrangements of the colonial regime drastically modified
traditional Fijian practices, asserts nonetheless that these
arrangements were something that "Fijians rapidly made their
233. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 3. The quotation illustrates Lawson's skepticism about
the merits of the traditional Fijian way of life, and that is another important issue to
which I will turn shortly. But just as authenticity is distinct from the question of current
attachment, so it is also distinct from the question of whether what is authentic is good
on other grounds.
234. See Marie R. Deveney, Courts and Cultural Distinctiveness, 25 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 867, 876-77 (1992).
235. Lawson devotes several pages to a discussion ofvarious manifestations of dissent
or discontent by commoner Fijians with regard to chiefly rule in the Fijian Administration
under the colonial regime. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 117-23. What struck me in
reading these pages was the relative paucity of examples that she could cite. In my eyes,
these pages confirmed, rather than challenged, the conventional view that these
arrangements were widely accepted.
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own and defended tenaciously for a century as the bulwark of
their neotraditional identity, of everything that was still
distinctively Fijian." 6 In other words, this is what the Fijians
themselves thought that they could maintain of the old ways
under new conditions, what they could preserve even if in
changed form. If that description is correct, then chiefly
authority, as institutionalized by these arrangements, ought to
be considered an authentic part of Fijian culture. In other words,
the issue of authenticity should not be used by people outside
a culture to call into question institutions and practices that those
within the culture regard as legitimate reflections of their
heritage.
Suppose that the apparently widespread acceptance of such
institutions and practices as authentic elements of the tradition
is the product of lies and coercion. Suppose that those in power
mislead ordinary people about their actual history and traditions,
presenting relatively recent innovations as things that date back
to time immemorial and repressing those who would challenge
their hegemonic view of the culture. 7 Can an authentic tradition
and legitimate authority be built on lies and coercion? Presum-
ably not. But one might also ask whether any actual system of
political socialization is likely to be entirely free of myths and
whether any actual form of political rule reproduces itself without
the use of power. While truth and unfettered consent provide
powerful critical ideals, we should not use those ideals to declare
an actual political system, such as Fiji's, to be inauthentic and
illegitimate, unless we are prepared to judge other actual systems
by the same standards. But, if all actual systems fail to meet
the standards, as I think clearly would be the case, then the most
important task may be to calculate degrees of inauthenticity and
illegitimacy, in short, to distinguish bad from worse.
If lies and coercion are really the key to a political system, then
one would expect the legitimacy of the system to collapse when
the lies are exposed and the coercion removed. The collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe provides an obvious illustration.
Decades of systematic socialization and indoctrination turned
out to be extremely ineffective when criticism.,and choice were
widely permitted.
236. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 4.
237. Lawson suggests that the Fijian chiefs have done exactly that with regard to
the arrangements regarding the land and chiefly rule. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at
104-11.
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In Fiji, whatever coercion might have sustained the system
of chiefly rule in earlier times-for example, the early colonial
regulation legally requiring Fijians to obey their chiefs in all
things lawful according to custom-long since has been re-
movedY With the introduction of democratic elections, a clear
route was open for dissatisfied native Fijians to challenge the
hegemony of the chiefly establishment, and some have taken that
route. For example, the chiefly establishment is dominated by
chiefs from eastern Fiji, and native Fijians from the western part
of Fiji have sometimes tried to build a political movement on the
basis of regional dissatisfactions with the status quo. Even the
Fijian Nationalist Party was, in certain respects, a reaction
against the chiefly establishment, and it occasionally employed
populist rhetoric against the chiefs." s Much of the political
rhetoric of the Fijian Labour Party provided an implicit challenge
to chiefly authority and offered native Fijians an alternative
political identity, based on social and economic interests rather
than ethnicity and culture. But none of these political challenges
was able to draw more than a relatively small number of native
Fijians away from the Alliance Party (which represented the
chiefly establishment), and then only for a brief period.24° As
I see it, these political patterns confirm what most observers of
Fiji report, that support for the chiefly leadership is not unani-
mous but is nevertheless very strong, even in the face of
challenges to that leadership from within the Fijian community.24
Of course, the chiefs enjoy political advantages because of their
positions, but those in power always enjoy advantages even in
democratic politics. The point is that it is not plausible to
attribute the ongoing acceptance of chiefly authority to raw
coercion.
But what about manipulation and deception? Again, the
question of degree is important. Lawson and others object that
the chiefly establishment misrepresents history and tradition,
presenting a uniform picture of what was in fact a diverse
238. The coup is a form ofcoercion, ofcourse, and one that I think renders the political
system established by it illegitimate, as I have argued above. See discussion supra part
III.D. But it is not this that Lawson has in mind in alleging the importance of coercion
to chiefly rule. See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
239. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 206-07.
240. Perhaps the Fijian Labour Party would have done so if it had been permitted
to govern and had carried out the sort of cross-ethnic program to which it was committed,
but the NFP/Labour Coalition appears to have won only about 9.6% of the native-Fijian
vote in the 1987 election. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 251.
241. See, e.g., Lal, supra note 10, at 96-98.
77&e Case of Fiji
616 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VoL25:3 & 4
tradition and concealing the colonial origins of the institutions
of chiefly authority. No doubt the defenders of chiefly authority
do present a sanitized and mythical picture of the Fijian past,
but some such mythologizing is a feature of the political culture
and childhood socialization system of every society so far as I
know. It is not a lie (even if it is a drastic oversimplification)
to say that chiefly rule was the traditional form of authority in
Fiji before colonial rule. Moreover, for the Fijian chiefs to pass
on this mythical picture of the Fijian past, they had to have the
initial cooperation of people who had lived through the actual
past. If most people had found the discrepancies between the
official picture and their own experience too jarring, they probably
would have passed on an alternative understanding to their
children. Nor is it clear why they would cooperate in a massive
deception in the absence of effective coercion to require them to
do so. It is easy, on the other hand, to understand why they
would cooperate in a process of mythologization that they found
congenial to their own sensibilities.
There is a second important point here about the limits to any
claim that Fijian tradition, and especially chiefly authority, is
based on deception. There was no significant censorship in Fiji
before the coup. Scholarly books have been written debunking
myths about the Fijian past, 2 and they are readily available
in Fiji. One may object that these works are accessible only to
an educated and sophisticated audience, but the contrast with
societies that make a systematic effort to restrict and control
information is significant. Again, political opponents of the chiefs
were free to try to make use of these findings. In short, the fact
that Fijian chiefs are not impartial purveyors of the truth about
Fijian traditional culture does not prove that chiefly authority
is inauthentic, that it is not really a significant element in Fijian
traditional culture.
Lawson also emphasizes that "pre-Christian superstitions,
together with some later Christian accretions, must be seen as
having played at least as important a role in maintaining chiefly
status and authority as any other factor."' Suppose that her
description is accurate. It is not clear why this would call into
question the authenticity of chiefly authority so long as these "pre-
Christian superstitions" and the "later Christian accretions" are
242. For example, Peter France launched a famous attack on the myths about Fijian
tradition with respect to land. See FRANCE, supra note 10, at 120-28.
243. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 102.
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seen as authentic parts of Fijian culture.' This might provide
grounds for criticizing the culture itself or at least certain aspects
of it, but that is a different challenge to which I will turn next.
B. Is Chiefly Authority Good for Fijians?
Is chiefly authority a good thing for the Fijians, even assuming
that it is an authentic part of their culture? This is a crucial
question that takes us back to the issue of the relation between
cultural difference and moral relativism and permits us to explore
it further in a context where the arguments for respecting
difference appear stronger to me. The position that I will defend
is one that gives some weight both to universal norms and to
particularity. Let me say at the outset, though, that I am
uncertain about the views I am putting forward, and I feel the
attraction of both more universalistic and more relativistic
positions.
How should North Americans like me and most of the readers
of this Journal try to answer a question like the one I have posed
about the merits of chiefly authority in Fiji?m Consider two
alternatives: one criticizes Fijian culture, including chiefly
authority, in the name of liberal ideals and standards, while the
other defends it in the name of difference.
1. The Liberal Challenge to Fijian Culture-One possible
answer to the question of whether chiefly authority is good
for the Fijians is to say that what is good for the Fijians is
244. The introduction of Christianity into Fiji provides an interesting illustration
of an outside cultural influence that is acknowledged by all, yet not rejected as alien
even by most ardent Fijian nationalists. On the contrary, Christianity has become part
of the Fijian way of life and is one of the features of that way of life that differentiates
native Fijians from most Indians. See HOWARD, supra note 10, at 371; NORTON, supra
note 10, at 12.
245. 1 will leave aside, though only for the moment, the question of how the role of
chiefly authority among native Fijians affects the interests of others, especially Fijian
Indians. Obviously, one important objection to chiefly authority is the claim that it
subverts democratic culture and institutions within Fiji as a whole. I will return to this
issue shortly. See infra part VII.C. For the moment, I want only to concentrate on the
question of whether it is good for native Fijians.
I do not intend to exclude by inadvertence the possibility that we should not try to
answer such questions at all. I have tried to indicate above why a principled refusal
to judge other cultures at all seems to me both morally wrong and practically impossible.
This does not mean, however, that we should not refrain from some sorts ofjudgments
about other cultures, and I will explore the possibility below that this issue fits in that
category. See infra part VII.B.3.
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what is good for us, namely, liberal democracy and capitalism,
with the accompanying culture of individualism and economic
acquisitiveness.246 From this perspective, chiefly authority
is bad because it is deeply contrary to these values.
From the beginning of the colonial period, and even earlier,
many European observers of Fiji advanced this sort of argument.
They regarded the chiefly hierarchy as exploitative and despotic.
Of course, the nineteenth-century critics were not trying to bring
economic equality and democracy to the native Fijians but rather
liberal economic freedoms, especially with regard to land and
labor. They saw chiefly authority as an obstacle to that because
they saw it as a crucial element in Fijian communalism, a way
of life that subordinated the interests of individuals to the
interests of the community and especially, they argued, to the
interests of the head of the community. 7
Here is what they found objectionable about traditional Fijian
life as they understood it: the members of a Fijian village were
expected not only to show personal deference to the local chief
but also to contribute to his material subsistence-farming for
him, supplying him with mats and cloth, and so on.' At the
same time, they were expected to participate in a variety of tasks
that one person could not easily do for himself, such as building
houses and canoes, and to assist in the duties of communal
maintenance. It was the chief's right and responsibility to call
upon people to provide labor for such activities and to direct it. 249
Also, people had extensive obligations to friends and relatives,
most notably in the practice of kerekere, under which a person's
friends and relatives could "request" her personal property, a
request that it would be shameful to refuse.' ° The conflict
between these communal practices and any individual opportuni-
ties or incentives for industry and accumulation seemed both
246. As with its famous predecessor, "[what's] good for the country is [what's] good
for General Motors," James Flanigan, GM Saga a Lesson for America, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
27, 1992, at Al (quoting the late Charles E. Wilson, president of General Motors
Corporation 40 years ago), my sentence creates an ambiguity about whether the relation-
ship between subject and predicate is to be construed in terms of parallelism or causal
dependency, and this in turn invites ironic speculation about whether the interests being
served by the claim in the sentence are unconscious or conscious of their exploitative
hegemony. On the other hand, I will argue below that this position-what is good for
the Fijians is what is good for us-cannot be rejected entirely. See infra text accompanying
notes 272-79.
247. MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 38-40.
248. The chief's entitlements were called his lala. Id. at 39.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 20-21.
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obvious and objectionable to the early Europeans."' It was no
wonder that the Fijians did not seek to go beyond subsistence
agriculture in their economic activity.
What the European settlers wanted was to make it possible
for individual Fijians to sell their land and their labor for cash,
the latter primarily taking the form of indentured contracts to
European planters. To facilitate this transformation, they wanted
the colonial government to impose poll taxes on native Fijians, 2
a policy that had been adopted elsewhere with the desired effect
of forcing people to supplement their employment in subsistence
agriculture with some sort of activity that generated a money
income. Of course, the colonial government did indeed have to
raise taxes from the native Fijians, but to the dismay of the
colonists, Gordon and his associates devised a system of indirect
taxation, building on the lala rights of the chiefs so that ordinary
Fijians effectively paid taxes in kind by working in communal
fields whose produce, often a cash crop, eventually went to
support the colonial government. 3 In addition, as I noted above,
Gordon prohibited native Fijians from engaging in indentured
labor on the plantations on the grounds that the departure of
men for the plantations would destroy the communal system of
labor that made Fijian village life possible. Further, he prohibited
ordinary Fijians from leaving their villages without the
permission of their local chief and gave the chiefs the legal
authority to enforce this and all traditional communal obligations.
And, of course, he prohibited the sale of Fijian land and
established a legal regime based on communal holdings.'
Gordon's contemporary critics did not argue that his efforts
were objectionable on the grounds that they were transforming
traditional Fijian culture, although, as we have seen, that claim
is true in important respects. Rather, they objected on the
grounds that Fijian culture was not worth preserving or that
there was a positive moral obligation to transform it to fit with
the norms of British liberalism.255 These sorts of arguments have
been a staple of a certain kind of criticism ever since. Thus, two
major reports, published around 1960 as part of the process of
preparing Fiji for independence, blamed the economic backward-
ness of native Fijians (compared with other inhabitants of Fiji,
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2.
253. Id. at 6-8.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 15-30.
255. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 57-58.
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especially the Indians who obviously had not begun from a
position of privilege) on the Fijian communal culture. Like the
earlier critics, they saw chiefly leadership as a key element in
maintaining that communalism and thus retarding the economic
progress of native Fijians.25
More recent critics, like Lawson, have repeated these critiques
of the negative economic effects of Fijian culture and added an
emphasis on the conflicts between democratic values and the
values on which chiefly authority rests. Since chiefly authority
is acquired as a hereditary status and requires deference from
commoners towards chiefs, it stands in deep and ineradicable
tension with the democratic idea that the legitimacy of public
authority should rest on the choices of the governed and with
the ethos of equal citizenship required to sustain democratic
institutions. 7
What should we make of these criticisms? To those who have
some sympathy for traditional Fijian culture and the attempts
to preserve it, the criticisms may appear smug and supercilious,
an example of what Macnaught calls a "cliched liberalism" that
simply assumed the moral superiority of Western and especially
British culture and too often ignored the actual devastating effects
of social reforms based on such liberal premises in Fiji and
elsewhere.25 So, let us turn now to that alternative.
2. Defending Fijian Difference-One approach to defending
Fijian culture, including chiefly authority, celebrates its
differences from the liberalism that purports to criticize it. Many
of the very features of Fijian society that liberal critics have found
so objectionable are the ones that have seemed most admirable
to some of the colonial administrators and to many of the Western
scholars who have written about Fiji. In particular, they have
admired a communal culture that embodies principles of mutual
caring and reciprocity, that places concern for the common good
above individual advantage, and that discourages acquisitiveness
256. Id. at 109-10.
257. Lawson's principal argument is that the perpetuation of the neotraditional Fijian
order, and especially its emphasis on chiefly authority, prevented the development of
a sufficiently strong democratic culture to sustain the transfer of legitimate power from
a party representing the chiefly establishment to a party representing Fijian Indians
and, to a lesser (but potentially greater) extent, Fijian commoners. In this section,
however, I want to focus on arguments about the merits of chiefly authority for native
Fijians themselves, leaving for later a discussion of effects on Fijian Indians. See infra
part VII.C. Part of Lawson's argument is that this undemocratic culture of chiefly
authority was bad for the native Fijians themselves.
258. See MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 103.
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and encourages respect for others. 59 So, even at the level of
moral ideals, Fijian communalism seems to many, including
myself, to offer an attractive alternative to the possessive individ-
ualism of liberal capitalism.
At the level of practice, too, the contrast between Fijian
communalism and liberal capitalism often favors Fijian
communalism if one cares about the well-being of the ordinary
person, and especially about those at the bottom. Macnaught,
for example, draws attention to the almost complete absence of
violent crime and destitution," as well as to the high quality
of housing, in Fijian village society during the first decades of
colonial rule. As liberal reforms took root, these conditions began
to deteriorate.26' E.K. Fisk stresses the protection that this way
of life still provides against the risks of capitalism. A native
Fijian commercial farmer or entrepreneur who fails is not bereft
of all support. He always can return to the less affluent but
secure existence of village life. Fijian communalism has not.pro-
duced a high level of surplus or material affluence, but it has
produced enough for the basic material wants of all, while
maintaining a rich ceremonial and social life.262 Given the
experiences of other societies, there is good reason to suppose
that a more rapid or radical transformation of Fijian culture in
a liberal direction would not have improved the lives of most
Fijians.
Let me add one qualification to all this. Most of these observers
do not celebrate chiefly authority as such. They are apt to see
chiefs as more responsive and responsible to the people, less
exploitative and domineering than the critics see them.2" But,
in the main, they see chiefly authority as an integral element
of Fijian communal life and therefore something to be respected
if one respects that way of life.
So far, I have described a defense of native Fijian culture that
celebrates the ways in which it differs from much Western liberal
individualism. There are two alternative forms of defense that
also deserve mention. First, one might argue that Western
liberalism is morally superior to Fijian culture but that it was
not, or is not, readily applicable to Fiji. In this view, which has
been embraced (if only for political reasons) by some Fijian
259. See, e.g., id. at 160-63.
260. Id. at 70.
261. Id. at 161.
262. FISK, supra note 10, at 45.
263. See, e.g., MACNAUGHT, supra note 10, at 38.
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traditionalists' and which fits as well with certain forms of
British imperialist thought,265 any attempt to transform Fijian
culture and institutions rapidly and radically in a Western
liberal direction would cause more harm than good, because
the history of Fiji has not prepared native Fijians to adapt
well to such an alternative. From this perspective, chiefly
authority is seen not as a good in itself or as an essential
element in a culture that has more significant intrinsic merit
than liberalism. Rather, the argument is simply that
liberalism is not a viable alternative for historical reasons,
and it is necessary to settle for the inferior but viable alterna-
tive of traditional Fijian culture. The great danger is that
reform efforts could destroy the traditional culture without
successfully replacing it with anything superior. The result
would be anomie and disorder, a far worse condition for native
Fijians than their situation under the traditional culture.
The other alternative is to defend Fijian culture on grounds
that link cultural difference more closely to moral relativism.
On this view, it is inappropriate, perhaps even wrong, for
outsiders to pass judgment on the merits of Fijian culture,
including chiefly authority, provided that it meets certain
minimum moral standards, such as not sanctioning the murder
of the innocent. Just as we ought to respect the rights of
individuals to make their own decisions about the good life and
how to achieve it, we must recognize that different individuals
will define the good differently. Therefore, we ought to respect
the rights of cultural collectives to develop and transmit their
own understandings of value and goodness, recognizing that
different cultural collectives will have different understandings
and practices. For both individuals and collectives, some minimal
standards must be respected, and how these are to be specified
is bound to be contested. Moreover, it is always possible to define
minimal standards that are so extensive and demanding that
they really amount to a comprehensive universal morality that
governs all significant aspects of individual and collective life.
But if this subterfuge is not adopted, then the principle of not
judging others-call it the "mind your own business principle"-
tells us that we should refuse to answer the question that I
posed at the beginning of this section about whether or not
chiefly authority is a good thing for the Fijians. This question
264. See discussion supra note 42.
265. See., e.g., sources cited supra note 172.
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is one that the Fijians themselves must decide on the basis
of their own understanding of "the good.
" 266
3. Minimal Moral Standards and the Good Life-The three
different defenses of Fijian culture that I have identified stand
in some tension with one another, perhaps even to the point of
outright conflict. I am drawn most strongly to the first defense,
the one celebrating the goodness of the Fijian way of life, yet I
think that there is something to be said for each of the defenses
and even for the opposing critique of Fijian culture in the name
of Western institutions and values. There are two crucial issues
here: the first is the question of how far minimal moral standards
extend; the second is the question of whether we ought to make
moral judgments about institutions and practices that meet mini-
mum moral standards (whatever those may be), or whether
instead we should simply acknowledge others' rights to conduct
their lives as they see fit within the sphere of the morally
permissible.
I already have argued for the applicability of minimal moral
standards to Fiji in my critique of the coup and the relegation
of Fijian Indians to the status of second-class citizens." Let me
try to explore that issue further by taking up some hypothetical
questions about the course ofFijian cultural evolution. According
to the reports of early nineteenth-century visitors to Fiji, Fijian
culture included such practices as the ritual killing of slaves in
connection with the building of chiefly houses and canoes and
the killing of a chiefs widow upon the death of her husband.2
Suppose that these practices were still part of Fijian culture
today. Would we be obliged not to pass judgment so as to respect
their autonomy or their cultural difference from us? One could
argue, of course, that we ought not to intervene to try to alter
the culture because indigenous cultures like Fiji's tend to change
with greater exposure to other cultures, and deliberate interven-
tion to change a culture often does more harm than good. But
could anyone argue that we should, as a matter of principle, show
respect for such practices as killing slaves or widows because
266. The line of argument advanced in this paragraph has strong affinities to Michael
Walzers views. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 312-21 (1983). I am not sure,
however, that he would agree entirely with it. The argument is also implicit, I think,
in some of Will Kymlicka's positions, despite his explicit rejection of what he takes to
be Walzer's relativism. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 231-35.
267. See supra part III.A.
268. See ScARR, FIJI: A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 10, at 3-19; THOMAS WILLIAMS&
JAMES CALVERT, FlI AND THE FIJIANS 148-52, 161-68 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1859).
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these practices constitute part of the cultural life of others? I
cannot imagine how one would try to defend that view.
Suppose that someone did not try to defend a strong form of
moral relativism directly, but rather tried to challenge the moral
relevance of my example. It would be fair for the critic to point
out that these sorts of reports tend to be characterized by bias,
exaggeration, and misinformation; that the legal regimes of some
Western states during the same period sanctioned both chattel
slavery and the violent subordination of wives to their husbands;
and that the question is purely hypothetical because Fijian
culture has not included such practices for over a century.
Consider what each of these objections implies. The first
merely suggests that we have the facts wrong or that there is
some way to tell the story of these practices that will make them
seem unobjectionable, without committing us to the principle that
we should not judge other cultures. The second objection makes
a valid historical point, but its implications for our moral
reasoning are unclear. There is a problem of anachronism in
making moral judgments about the past, but I do not think that
this means we simply can refuse to make such judgments.269
Thinking about the past from a moral perspective is a lot like
thinking about other cultures from a moral perspective. In both
cases, it is easy and dangerous to adopt a smug and superficial
assumption about the moral superiority of our own time and
place, an assumption that enables us to avoid self-examination
and self-criticism. In both cases, it can reasonably be argued,
we have to pay attention to context and circumstance before
passing judgment. But can we avoid judgment altogether? What
would it mean to live in a moral world in which we made no
moral judgments about past practices and actions? How would
we know what to praise or to blame, what to preserve or to
reform? A moral world unguided by the past seems, almost
literally, unimaginable to me."' But a moral world guided by
269. What would it be like to tell the story of slavery and its abolition in America
without incorporating any moral judgments into the story? I do not mean to imply that
the moral judgments are easy or uncontested. On the contrary, consider whether we should
admire or despise (or both admire and despise) Abraham Lincoln, Robert E. Lee, and
John Brown. These judgments are still debated today. For one thoughtful exploration
of this period that is clearly informed by a passionate moral commitment, see ROBERT
M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975). But what would it be like to feel obliged not to make
any moral judgments about this history?
270. By "moral world," I do not mean simply a philosophical system, but a way of
thinking that guides and informs actual moral judgments. In fact, there are few, if any,
philosophical systems of morality that do not incorporate, implicitly or explicitly,
judgments about the past.
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the past is one in which we make moral judgments about the
past. Similarly, a moral world informed by our knowledge of
other cultures is one in which we make judgments about other
cultures-judgments about what to condemn, what to admire,
and what to accept as different.
The third objection, focusing on the hypothetical character of
my question, I find more difficult to answer. On the one hand,
I think actual cases are usually a more fruitful focus for reflection
than hypothetical ones. Hypothetical cases tend to serve the
interests of the argument for which they are constructed. Actual
cases encourage reflection because of the complexity and
ambiguity that they contain. They are more apt to take us in
unanticipated directions and to broaden our sense of what
matters. (That is why I chose to focus on the actual case of Fiji,
rather than some imaginary island state whose history could be
tidied up to serve the interests of the points I wanted to make.)
On the other hand, this is a contingent judgment. Hypothetical
cases can be illuminating and challenging, and I see no reason
why they should be excluded in principle. Part of what I am
trying to explore in this section is how much my moral judgments
about the legitimacy of preserving Fijian culture are shaped by
the fact that Fijian culture is not radically at odds with liberal
values and institutions. To explore that issue, it seems helpful
to imagine greater divergence than we find at present, and the
most plausible sort of divergence is the kind that actually can
be found in Fiji's past.
Suppose that no one wants to defend the killing of slaves or
widows. Even with this consensus, we are still a long way from
the institutions and practices of liberal democracies. For example,
Michael Walzer supports the idea that basic human rights set
some limits to what may be done to people in the name of culture,
but he defends as just a hypothetical caste society in which the
principles of hierarchy and caste differentiation are accepted by
all of the members of the society, including those in the lower
castes.27' Fiji's most violent practices had disappeared by the
271. See WALZER, supra note 266, at 313-15. In my view, this example illustrates
some of the problems of hypothetical cases. Walzer, while beginning with a description
of an actual Indian village, goes on to assume a degree of uncoerced acceptance of caste
norms that seems deeply problematic. It would have been more challenging if Walzer
had pointed to an actual caste system or other contemporary inegalitarian social system
that he thought defensible because the participants in it accepted its principles of
distribution.
The Case of Fiji
626 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reforn [VOL.25:3 & 4
time of Cession or soon after, 27 2 but the colonial regime clearly
included a number of illiberal policies. Take, for example, the
restrictions on personal mobility, requiring people to get the
permission of the chief to leave the village for any extended
period, and the absence of formal democratic procedures for
selecting rulers. Leave aside here the question of how we
should judge such policies in their original context. Suppose
these or similar policies were reintroduced today as part of
the movement to preserve traditional culture. How should
we respond?
It seems to me that we would be justified in criticizing such
policies as a violation of individual freedom.2 7 3 Again, this does
not mean that we should try to intervene in any way. I am not
even interested here in the question of whether we should try
to communicate this criticism to the Fijians. The question is
whether this sort of judgment is a morally inappropriate form
of cultural imperialism. I think not. These freedoms-the
freedom to leave the village and to vote for officials-seem to me
to be part of the minimal moral standards that any regime should
be expected to meet. I do not mean to suggest that there could
never be circumstances in which it would be justifiable not to
meet these standards, but rather that they should be taken as
norms that apply to all societies so that departures from them
could not be justified simply by saying, "That is not the way we
do things around here." To justify violating these standards, one
would have to show that the violation is necessary to meet some
urgent public interest that could not be met in a way that
respected the standards, and how eventually it will be overcome.
There is another reason why these freedoms set moral limits
to Fijian institutions and practices: they are essential today to
support the claim that Fijian culture deserves to be protected
and preserved. One major argument for why we should respect
native Fijian culture and attempt to preserve it is that this is
272. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 45-47.
273. Some would see the policy establishing collective and inalienable ownership of
land as a violation of individual freedom as well, but I would not. Property rights always
are the creation of the state and always are constructed in ways that must be justified
by reference to their effects not only on the owners but also on the other members of
the community. Most defenders of private property offer precisely such a justification,
arguing that individual and alienable forms of property ownership lead to greater benefits
for all by creating incentives for the productive use ofresources. For the classic exposition
of this position, see JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690). Whatever the
merits of those arguments in other contexts, I have tried to show above why they were
not apposite in Fiji at the time of colonization, despite the explicit use of such arguments
by European settlers, and why they still are not compelling today.
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what the native Fijians themselves want. That argument itself
is built on democratic principles; people are entitled to get the
kind of public policies and institutions they want, within limits.
One major reason for believing that native Fijians want to
preserve their culture, including some form of chiefly authority,
is that they continue to live in the villages and they keep voting
for political parties that make these concerns a central element
of their appeals to the electorate.274 In other words, this claim
about what native Fijians want has received considerable
validation from the right of individual mobility and from liberal
democratic processes of free and contested elections. Of course,
we all know the weaknesses of such processes as methods of
validating what people want. Freedom of movement can seem
hollow if there is no reasonably attractive place to which one can
go. People may not be satisfied with their choices in elections.
Whatever the weaknesses of liberal democratic procedures, they
are far more reliable as indicators of what people want, in most
cases, than are the alternatives. For example, we have much
less sense about the extent and degree of popular support among
native Fijians for the coup and its policies than for the Alliance
Party and its policies. Some people argue that many of the recent
"reforms" really are aimed not at Fijian Indians, but at Fijian
commoners who have grown restive about chiefly authority and
village life and might like to explore alternatives.275 The most
persuasive challenge to that argument, in my view, is the
evidence of voting patterns in the last election, which shows
relatively little support among native Fijians for this alterna-
tive.276 But the critics might be right about the direction in which
ordinary Fijian views are developing. Without a reasonably open,
fair, and effective electoral mechanism, how will we know?
Moreover, if the critics are right, would we want to defend the
preservation of Fijian culture and chiefly authority against the
wishes of the Fijian people?
That last question is not purely rhetorical. One could argue
that the traditional culture (including chiefly authority) has been
good for native Fijians, whether they know it or not, and that
it should be preserved whether ordinary Fijians would vote for
it or not. That is certainly the sort of position that Ratu Sukuna
would have taken, given his skepticism about the relation
274. LASAQA, supra note 10, at 34; LAWSON, supra note 10, at 230.
275. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 10, at 280-81.
276. See id. at 252 (stating that "the coalition did not make huge inroads into the
Fijian vote").
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between democratic processes and wise political rule and his
confidence in Fijian institutions, including chiefly rule. 7 I would
not want to say that such an argument could never be valid,
though I think that the chances of its being valid in the
contemporary world grow increasingly remote. But I do not think
that such an argument is plausible in Fiji today. Much of the
recent history and recent experience of chiefly leadership does
not inspire confidence in their ability to lead effectively or in their
selfless dedication to the common good.278
In sum, minimal moral standards set significant constraints
on morally permissible cultural variation. If the institutions and
policies of independent Fiji before the coup seem morally
permissible, as I have generally argued that they do, that is
because they generally respected basic individual freedoms and
political rights. Within the limits set by minimal moral
standards, there can still be an important range of cultural
variation. Here, it seems to me that the arguments in defense
of Fijian culture are potentially complementary. One can think
that Fijian culture ought to be respected and preserved both
because it is the Fijians' and they want to preserve it, and
because one has formed an independent judgment that it is an
admirable culture that provides meaning and structure to the
lives of the people who participate in it. On the whole, I think
that the former judgment takes priority over the latter. As I
argued above, it would be hard to defend preservation if the
Fijians themselves did not want it. But the latterjudgment adds
weight. It is easier to defend limited departures from democratic
norms for the sake of preserving a culture when the culture is
one that evokes admiration, not just toleration.
Finally, if a moral defense is to be offered of the earlier policies
and practices that constrained freedom and limited democracy,
it should be one that emphasizes context and the limited range
of feasible alternatives at the time, rather than one that seeks
to deny the relevance of liberal democratic standards to Fiji in
the name of cultural difference. On the other hand, not every
aspect of the liberal tradition deserves equal weight. In
particular, the possessive individualism that seems to animate
so many critics of traditional Fijian culture reflects a vision of
the human good that has itself been subject to considerable moral
277. See SCARR, RATU SUKUNA, supra note 10, at 140-41.
278. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 277-82 (stating that, before the coup, the chiefly
establishment feared that it was beginning to lose its hold over its people and criticizing
its use of race "to incite fear and insecurity amongst Fijians").
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criticism on the basis of deeper liberal commitments. 279 Whatever
side one takes in this debate, the arguments should open up a
space within democratic politics within which people are morally
free to choose among competing visions of how society ought to
be organized.
C. Democracy, Chiefly Authority, and Fijian Difference
I already have considered some of the crucial dimensions of
the relation between chiefly authority and democracy in the
previous section, but I want to conclude here by taking up the
central argument of Lawson's book-that the vision of Fijian
culture that emerged from the colonial regime, with its emphasis
on the homogeneity of the native Fijian tradition and the
centrality of chiefly authority, led inexorably to the definition
of political differences along ethnic lines and undermined the
legitimacy of democratic institutions in Fiji. 2  In this view, the
efforts to preserve Fijian culture would not have been morally
justified, even if those efforts themselves had violated no moral
principles and had led to the preservation of an authentic Fijian
culture that was good for native Fijians, because of the inevitably
negative impact of those efforts on democracy in Fiji and thus
on the other citizens, especially Fijian Indians. By contrast, I
want to argue that Lawson's account underestimates the
contingency of the failure of democracy (though at one point she
emphasizes this point herself"') and fails to assess alternative
feasible paths for political development in Fiji, thus implicitly
underestimating their costs and overestimating the likelihood
of their success.
Perhaps I should say at the outset that my own sympathies
lie, like Lawson's, with the members of the Fijian Labour Party.
I admire the goals they were pursuing-building a multiracial,
democratic, and egalitarian society in Fiji - and I admire the skill
and dedication with which they pursued these goals. By contrast,
279. See, eg., CB. MACPESN, DEmocRAnc TThORY: ESSAYS IN REIgEVAL 10-11 (1973)
(arguing that a capitalist market society diminishes the equal individual freedom to
develop natural capacities).
280. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 1-2.
281. See id. at 286.
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the Fijian chiefs appear, at least in the literature that I have
read, to be a privileged elite primarily concerned with protecting
their own interests. 282
Why then would I try to defend the chiefs-not the
coup-against Lawson's critique? There are two reasons. The
first is connected to democratic principles: people have a right
to choose their leaders, even bad leaders. The vast majority
(normally over ninety percent) of native Fijians have voted quite
consistently for their chiefs or for a party built around chiefly
leadership. Even in the 1987 election, which they lost, the chiefly
leadership retained the support of an overwhelming number of
native Fijians. Again, let me emphasize that I am not defending
the coup or calling into question the legitimacy of the Bavadra
government. The point is that ifone were to ask which politicians
spoke for most native Fijians, the answer would be obvious -just
as in previous elections, if one asked which party spoke for most
Fijian Indians, the answer would have been obvious.'
The second reason is related to culture. As I read the history
of Fiji, the chiefs do have a central role in Fijian culture, even
if one accepts the claims of critics, such as Lawson, that the
chiefly establishment has exaggerated its role and obscured
the diversity of Fijian culture. Most ordinary Fijians recognize
their chiefs as significant social leaders, however much they
may criticize them and complain about them in some contexts.
Lawson rightly notes that this form of leadership stands in
tension with democratic principles, 2 4 but I do not think that
provides sufficient grounds for rejecting its legitimacy alto-
gether. On the contrary, if this cultural connection were not
there, it would make no sense to turn to an institution like
the Council of Chiefs when trying to select people who will
be seen by native Fijians as plausible representatives for them
on matters relating to culture and tradition. Of course, some
members of the Council, under the pre-coup arrangements,
held their seats simply because they held certain elective
offices, a seat in Parliament for example. Others, however,
acquired their position through heredity, not elections. To
be sure, one could throw the question back one step further
and ask whether an institution like the Council of Chiefs is
morally appropriate. Here, I think the answer I offered earlier
282. See, e.g., id. at 279-81.
283. This claim needs to be qualified with regard to subgroups of Fijian Indians.
See supra text accompanying note 114.
284. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 1-2, 9-11, 243-44.
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is sufficient: special protection for certain native Fijian
cultural interests, such as land, was justified because the inter-
ests were both vital and potentially vulnerable.2"5
Let me turn now to the issue of contingency. Lawson's
argument is that the separate administration and other
institutions designed to preserve Fijian culture greatly contrib-
uted to the salience of ethnic identity in Fiji. This in turn led
to the view that separate forms of political representation were
desirable, and that led to the sense that representatives of the
"other" group, Fijian Indians, could not legitimately hold political
power over native Fijians, even as a result of free elections.
Democratic principles were respected only so long as they put
representatives of native Fijians in power.286
Clearly there is a lot to be said for this argument. But Lawson
makes the sequence seem at times almost inevitable. It is always
tempting to suppose that what did happen, had to happen. Yet
she herself concedes that the coup was not inevitable. Rabuka,
the coup leader, had two superiors who were loyal to the
constitution. Had they received word about the plot, they might
well have been able to forestall it. Bavadra's government
probably would have stayed in power, and the story of Fiji would
have a very different line of development. 7
It is equally important to recognize that the absence of
measures to preserve native Fijian culture would have provided
no guarantee of postcolonial ethnic harmony. One has only to
glance around the world to see that failures greatly outnumber
successes when it comes to ethnic harmony and democratic
government in postcolonial regimes.2  Before the coup, Fiji was
widely cited as one of the most promising stories, a multiracial
democracy with no ethnic violence.289 The contingent failure of
that promise does not mean that the belief that it was one of the
most promising societies was incorrect. On the contrary, if that
prior judgment was correct, then that suggests that the efforts
to preserve native Fijian culture were not necessarily bad, even
from the perspective of their impact on the long-term prospects
for building a democratic society in Fiji.
285. See supra part VI.
286. See LAWSON, supra note 10, at 4-6, 9.
287. Id. at 286.
288. See DONALD L HoRowITz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 3-4 (1985) (listing numerous
examples of ethnic conflict, including the recurrent hostilities in Northern Ireland, seces-
sionist warfare in Burma, and Sikh terrorism).
289. See, eg., SCARR, POLITICS OF ILLUSION, supra note 10, at 6 (noting Pope John Paul
II's description of Fiji as a symbol of hope for the world.)
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